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I. Research  Question 
Richness can be embarrassing. Oligopoly has been among the first topics in experimental eco-
nomics, starting as early as 1959 (Hoggatt 1959; Selten and Sauermann 1959). In the meantime, 
a total of 154 experimental papers has been published
1. Many of them report on more than one 
experiment, so that there is data on much more than 500 different parameter constellations
2. 
There is a number of survey articles (Friedman 1969; Plott 1982; Plott 1989; Davis and Holt 
1993; Holt 1995; Lupi and Sbriglia 2003; Huck, Normann et al. 2004; Suetens 2004; Suetens and 
Potters 2005). But the latest comprehensive survey is a decade old. Moreover, it does not make 
the findings comparable across publications. This is undertaken in the present meta-study. It uses 
a simple question to turn the richness of the material into a boon: how much collusion have the 
respective experimenters found? More than one would normatively want? And more than game 
theory would expect?  
Specifically, this study not only compares what experimenters have set out to test. In order to test 
subjects on their respective research question, they had to specify a whole array of other parame-
ters, like product characteristics, market size, the shape of supply and demand, the strategic vari-
able, the duration of the game, communication protocols, the information environment, and trad-
ing institutions. That way they have generated a rich body of data that has remained untapped 
thus far. This meta-study makes this data available. 
This richness of the data has a third advantage. The sample is large enough to make many inter-
action effects significant. The most important ones are presented here. 
Actually, these questions are not only helpful in generating order. They are also decisive for the 
main users of oligopoly experiments: the antitrust authorities. There are two main ways how 
these authorities may put experimental findings to productive use. Even in legal orders as dedi-
cated to antitrust enforcement as the US, the European Community or Germany, administrative 
resources are limited. Knowing which factors facilitate collusion most helps these authorities 
detect instances of collusion.  
Yet the relevance is not confined to administrative policy. Getting the expected degree of collu-
sion right also matters in doctrinal terms. Both in the US
3 and in Europe,
4 merger control inter-
venes if the fact that a previously independent commercial entity disappears from the market 
makes “tacit collusion“ substantially more likely. The behavioural evidence helps antitrust au-
thorities in their ensuing predictive task. For them, understanding interaction effects is particu-
                                        
1   For references see the list at the end of this paper. 
2   For the reasons laid out in section II, this study covers 510 independent observations. 
3   Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Division, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
of September 10, 1992, 57 FR 41552, Section 2.1. 
4   Court of First Instance, 6 June 2002, Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities, European 
Court Reports 2002 II 2585, at para. 60; Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, OJ 2004 C 31/5, para. 22, 39, 
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larly relevant. They have to find out whether the co-presence of two or more factors makes it 
more or less likely that collusion happens.  
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section II specifies the methodology. Sec-
tion III presents the evidence on product characteristics. Section IV addresses market structure, 
section V supply and demand, section VI seller characteristics, section VII seller interaction, sec-
tion VIII the information environment, and section IX buyer activity. Section X concludes. 
II. Methodology 
Individual experimental papers often excel in sophistication. They for instance offer complex 
theoretical models for explaining the data. Recently, a wealth of learning theories has been used 
for the purpose (see in particular Sherman 1969; Shubik, Wolf et al. 1971; Cox and Walker 
1998; Nagel and Vriend 1999b; Nagel and Vriend 1999a; Rassenti, Reynolds et al. 2000; Capra, 
Goeree et al. 2002; Offerman, Potters et al. 2002; Anderhub, Güth et al. 2003; Bosch-Domènech 
and Vriend 2003; Altavilla, Luini et al. 2005). Others present demanding statistical models (e.g. 
Daughety and Forsythe 1987; Benson and Faminow 1988; Davis, Reilly et al. 2003; Davis and 
Wilson 2005). Most papers give graphical information on time series. None of this works for a 
study that aims at being as encompassing as possible. The reason is simple. Many publications 
do not offer the data one would need for the purpose.  
One information, however, is hardly ever missing: which has been the effect of the respective 
treatment on the strategic variable of the oligopolists (which is normally either price or quan-
tity)? Specifically, in the large majority of papers, this information is given per instance of inter-
action. If the author has not done so anyhow, it is easy to calculate the mean for all rounds of 
interaction. Of course, duration matters. In a typical experiment, there is a pronounced change 
from the initial rounds over the middle of the game towards end effects (Selten and Stoecker 
1986). If one adds many more rounds, the characteristic picture may reverse (Alger 1987). But 
duration varies so profoundly from experiment to experiment that only comparing aggregates is 
feasible. Since the number of rounds from which the mean is taken is always reported, one may 
control the result for total duration.  
Absolute price or quantity is not meaningful across experiments. One needs a standardised 
benchmark. Actually, in oligopoly games there are three such benchmarks: the Walrasian and the 
collusive benchmarks always exist. In the standard Bertrand situation, the Walrasian and the 
Nash benchmark coincide (Bertrand 1883). But when marginal cost is not constant, or when 
firms compete in quantity, to name only the two most important reasons, the Nash equilibrium 
predicts a different outcome. Typically, it is between the Walrasian and the collusive expecta-
tions. This makes for the following picture. 
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The distance between the Walrasian equilibrium WE and the collusive equilibrium CE is defined 
as 100% of collusion. The dashed line is an example for the reported value of the strategic vari-
able, say price. In the example, this value lies 40% above the Walrasian level. This index is re-
ported as CW. However, compared to the Nash equilibrium, there is only 10% collusion. This is 
due to the fact that the span for calculating this index only covers the distance between the Nash 
equilibrium NE and the collusive equilibrium CE. It is reported as CN. 
Of course, the reported value may be below the Nash equilibrium. In that case, the degree of col-
lusion above Nash is indicated by a negative number. The distance to the left of the Nash equi-
librium point is expressed as a fraction of the distance between NE and CE. Sometimes the re-
ported value is even below WE. In that case, also the distance from WE to the left is expressed as 
a fraction of the distance between WE and CE, and it carries a negative sign. If the strategic vari-
able is quantity, a small number means a high degree of collusion. To capture this, the reported 
quantity is normalised by how much it lies below, not above the Walrasian expectation.  
There is one study in the literature following a similar approach. It compares experiments on 
Cournot games, and investigates how the number of sellers in the market matters (Huck, Nor-
mann et al. 2004). This study has introduced a different index. For all papers included in that 




It thus expresses mean quantity from the experiment as a fraction of the respective Nash expecta-
tion. This is a less reliable measure. It is sensitive to arbitrary changes in the level of  N Q . This 
becomes patent in experiments that use an identical relative specification of demand and supply, 
but shift the level of the Walrasian equilibrium from experiment to experiment. Experimenters   5
sometimes have done so in order to exclude parameter learning (for an example see Isaac, 
Ramey et al. 1984)
5. Moreover, this index generates high values if  N Q  is very small, and low 
values if  N Q  is very high in absolute terms. And it cannot be calculated if an experimenter has 
normalised 0 = N Q . For three reasons, this index is nonetheless calculated wherever possible. It 
is reported as NN. First it makes comparisons easier with the (small) set of papers in the litera-
ture that presents this index. Occasionally the CN index suffers from a mirror problem. If the 
Nash equilibrium is close to the collusive equilibrium, this index grows very large. In the ex-
periments covered by this study, however, this is a rare event. Most importantly, however, there 
are several treatment variables where the NN index is significant, while the CN index is not. 
60 of the 510 experiments covered in this study use a stranger design. In every round, subjects 
are rematched. Behaviourally speaking, this is not the same as one-shot interaction. From round 
2 on, subjects come with the expectations built in previous rounds. But it at least is as good an 
approximation as is feasible with the experimental method. In the remaining 460 experiments, 
however, interaction is repeated. As is known from the folk theorem, this leads to multiple Nash 
equilibria if there is uncertainty about the end of the game (Aumann and Shapley 1994). Of 
course, the data on repetition effects is reported here. However, for calculating the Nash bench-
mark, repetition is ignored. The benchmark is always taken from the one-shot game. 
The large majority of the experiments covered in this study use a computer to simulate the oppo-
site market side. This computer is programmed as a non-strategic actor. It simply represents the 
demand curve. Equilibrium analysis becomes much more demanding if there are strategic actors 
on both sides of the market. In order to make the data comparable across treatments, this element 
of the situation is ignored when calculating the Nash equilibrium in the minority of experiments 
with human buyers. The benchmark is always exclusively taken from the interaction between 
sellers, i.e. assuming passive buyers. 
The number of papers which themselves calculate one of the three indices is very small (see e.g. 
Cason and Davis 1995). But generating them is straightforward if the benchmarks and the means 
are reported. This, however, is often not the case. Whenever possible, these calculations have 
been done in preparation of this meta-study. Often this meant optimisation calculus. If the Wal-
rasian benchmark was missing, often the industry demand and supply functions had to be con-
structed from firm functions, or directly from the cost functions. Occasionally, the reported val-
ues had to be weighted for calculating the means, for instance if discrete outcomes had different 
frequencies. The data bank behind this paper specifies which parameters could not be taken di-
rectly from the respective paper, and it explains which kind of judgement has been exercised in 
so doing, if necessary. It is publicly available.  
Following the theory of induced valuation (Smith 1976), in the Seventies and Eighties, many 
experimenters have given their subjects step functions for supply and demand. Determining the 
                                        
5   Take the following simple example: in the first experiment, WE = 0, CE = 100, NE = 50, experimental data 
40. In this case, the index is 40/50 = 0,8. Now shift the scale by 100, leaving relative positions unaffected. 
Now WE = 100, CE = 200, NE = 150, experimental data 140. Now the index is 140/150 = 0,9333.   6
Walrasian equilibrium is straightforward with step functions. It is the point where the two step 
functions cross. Calculating the collusive equilibrium requires trial and error, but is doable. 
However, since these functions are characterised by discontinuities, there is often no Nash equi-
librium in pure strategies. Calculating the mixed equilibria is theoretically possible, but it is a 
formidable task (Holt and Solis-Soberon 1992). If the authors themselves have done so, and if 
they have come up with a single equilibrium, the expected value is taken as the Nash benchmark. 
But the effort for doing so for all the remaining papers with step functions would have been pro-
hibitive. Instead, it is only checked whether there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (at or 
directly above the Walrasian equilibrium). If this is not the case, the two indices relying on the 
Nash equilibrium are left blank. This is the main, but not the only reason why it has not been 
possible for all papers to calculate all three indices. The databank specifies which indices are 
missing, and for which reason. In the presentation of the results, for each index the composition 
of the sample is presented separately. 
47 papers have a pertinent topic, but are not included in this meta-study. There are different rea-
sons for excluding them. Most frequently, in the paper there are only graphs, but no exact num-
bers for calculating the means. In other cases, it is not possible to calculate the benchmarks, for 
instance because a step function is only presented graphically and measurement scales cannot be 
reconstructed from the graph. Sometimes, the research question is too far away, for instance if 
the experimenters have given their subjects so little information that it is meaningless to talk 
about collusion. Finally, some papers do not give summary statistics, but exclusively regressions, 
and the model is such that the data relevant for this comparative paper cannot be reconstructed. 
Also, experiments on spatial competition are excluded. 
The data is presented the following way. The main effect of each treatment variable is calculated 
three times. The first calculation covers all experiments with the respective feature. It is called 
the gross data. Some papers do not report the standard variable. They for instance do not indicate 
industry profit, or the necessary elements for calculating it, when sellers are asymmetric. In such 
cases, the best available proxy is taken for calculating the indices.
6 Other papers do not give data 
for all rounds of repetition, but only for some of them. Such somehow unusual data is excluded 
from the second calculation. It is called ordinary coverage. Finally, the effect is calculated a 
third time with data taken only from those experiments where this was a treatment variable. This 
is called the treatment data.  
All effects are tested for significance by way of ANOVA. That way, interaction effects can be 
analysed as well. The samples are relatively large. However, variance might not always be ho-
mogeneous in subsamples. Moreover, the number of cases in each subsample is not always bal-
anced. For both reasons, ANOVA results might not be fully reliable (see Hays 1994:10.20). 
Therefore, as a double-check, the main effects are also tested with a non parametric test.
7 If the 
independent variable is dichotomous, a Mann Whitney U Test is used. If the independent vari-
                                        
6   The respective proxy is specified in the data bank. 
7   Reinhard Selten had suggested to do so.   7
able has more than two categories, a Kruskal Wallis test is applied (as suggested by Bortz 
2005:287). In most cases, the p-values are similar. Not so rarely, the non parametric test even 
yields a smaller p-value than the ANOVA. 
In order to save space, insignificant findings are not presented. Weakly significant findings 
(p<0,1) are reported where the result seems sufficiently relevant. The treatment data, however, is 
always reported. This is justified since experimenters themselves had to check for significance. 
The results of the non parametric test are only presented if the ANOVA has yielded a significant 
result. 
III.  Dependence of Collusion on Product Characteristics 
1.  Homogeneity vs. Heterogeneity of Goods 
 
If products are (imperfect) substitutes, producers each have their own niche. There is some com-
petitive pressure, but competition is monopolistic (Chamberlin 1933). Consequently, sellers 
should do better if there is heterogeneity of products. This expectation is borne out if one com-
pares experimental data to the Walrasian equilibrium. In such markets sellers typically charge 
different prices, and they sell different quantities. Therefore the strategic variable is not a good 
indicator of collusion. Wherever possible, it is replaced by industry profit.
8  
 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
homogeneous 30,0403023  40,1702612 419 0  0
heterogeneous 67,4634146  26,0427925 91    
ordinary cov-




homogeneous 18,4556962  30,8799469 237 0,001  0
heterogeneous 42,1052632  21,7967753 19    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA 
homogeneous 42,8  38,317098 5 0,003  0,058




Homogeneity: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(Legend: CW: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
SD: Standard Deviation 
  NOS: Number of Observations   
ANOVA: Univariate Analysis of Variance 
OC: sample reduced to experiments with Ordinary Coverage 
T: sample reduced to experiments where homogeneity was a Treatment variable) 
 
 
                                        
8   For details see the databank.   8
Provided cost structures are similar, if products are heterogeneous, game theory expects an 
outcome above the competitive equilibrium for each of the products; there is much less competi-
tive pressure after all. The empirical picture is not very clear. The only weakly significant result 
is on the NN index in the gross sample. There is collusion in both types of markets, but it is 
much stronger with homogeneous products. The treatment data from the CN index is insignifi-
cant, but points into the same direction. However, the treatment data on the NN index has the 
opposite result. This result too, however, is insignificant. 
 
 
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA 
T CN Mann 
Whitney 
homogeneous -0,4  70,9175578 5 0,875  0,855
heterogeneous -6,67647059 84,1667611 34    
 
Table 2 
Homogeneity: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(Index: CN: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equlibrium 




gross  NN  NN (SD)  NN NOS  NN ANOVA 
NN Mann-
Whitney 
homogeneous 50,6590164  229,032508 305 0,098  0,492
heterogeneous 8,65853659 21,4713243 82    
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA   
homogeneous 2,6  19,1911438 5 0,491  0,823
heterogeneous 10,2352941 23,3433643 34    
 
Table 3 
Homogeneity: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(Legend: NN: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium  
data from ordinary coverage sample insignificant) 
 
 
A look at interaction effects clears the picture. When products are homogeneous, there is a cer-
tain positive deviation from the Nash expectation if subjects are rematched every round. If they 
have a fixed partner, the result is slightly below the Nash expectation. The pattern dramatically 
changes if products are heterogeneous. Now strangers end up far below the Nash expectation, 
whereas partners are somewhat above. If products are homogeneous, the distinction between si-
multaneous and sequential play has little effect on deviations from the Nash equilibrium. How-
ever with heterogeneity, in simultaneous interaction there is a small positive deviation from the 
Nash benchmark, whereas in sequential interaction the outcome is far below. If products are ho-
mogeneous and supply is constant, there is a small degree of collusion. If the supply curve has a 
positive slope, the deviation from the Nash equilibrium is negative. The pattern dramatically re-
verses if products are heterogeneous. Now subjects fall below the Nash expectation if gains from 
collusion are large. They end up high above the Nash benchmark if gains from collusion are 
small.    9
If products are homogeneous and sellers are symmetric, there is less collusion than the Nash 
equilibrium predicts. The opposite is true when sellers are asymmetric. This totally changes if 
products are heterogeneous. Now seller symmetry yields a positive deviation from the Nash 
benchmark, whereas seller asymmetry pushes sellers far below the Nash prediction. Finally if 
products are homogeneous and capacity is unconstrained, sellers achieve a small surplus over the 
Nash expectation. The opposite is true if capacity is constrained. The picture reverses if products 
are heterogeneous. Now unconstrained capacity leads to a result below Nash, whereas con-
strained capacity induces subjects to collude at a level far above the Nash benchmark.  
 
partner/stranger  partner  partner (SD)  partner NOS  partner/stranger Sig. 
homogeneous -5,19548872  83,8680868 266  0,05786161
heterogeneous 3,04938272  65,5322251 81 
 stranger  stranger (SD)  stranger NOS 
homogeneous 11,7291667  35,5460382 48 
heterogeneous -36,5555556  122,054405 9 
sequence  simultaneous  simultaneous (SD)  simultaneous NOS  sequence Sig. 
homogeneous -3,83773585  83,4581646 265  0
heterogeneous 8,63095238  59,4431549 84 
 sequential   sequential (SD)  sequential NOS 
homogeneous 4,04081633  44,1606722 49 
heterogeneous -134,5  116,135696 6 
surplus  symmetric  symmetric (SD)  symmetric NOS  surplus Sig. 
homogeneous -4,9  61,5540413 90  0,04078703
heterogeneous 52  29,2711462 6 
 consumer  consumer (SD)  consumer NOS 
homogeneous 6,39  50,5182976 200 
heterogeneous -4,69047619  73,8901784 84 
symmetry  symmetric  symmetric (SD)  symmetric NOS  symmetry Sig. 
homogeneous -5,59911894  89,9633288 227  0,00614978
heterogeneous 13,2459016  40,4753652 61 
 asymmetric  asymmetric (SD)  asymmetric NOS 
homogeneous 5,1954023  33,8546273 87 
heterogeneous -30,6896552  110,065598 29 
capacity  unconstrained unconstrained  (SD) unconstrained NOS  capacity Sig. 
homogeneous 5,79545455  48,9326439 176 0,00084469
heterogeneous -14,2769231  80,5259096 65 
 constrained  constrained (SD)  constrained NOS 
homogeneous -13,326087  104,207203 138 
heterogeneous 33,84  27,8652711 25 
 
Table 4 
Homogeneity: Interaction Effects 
(normalized deviation from the Nash equilibrium) 
   10
2. Effect  of  Introducing Fixed Costs 
All three benchmarks for this study are taken from the one-shot situation. On the short run, for 
rational actors only marginal, and hence variable cost should matter. However, subjects interact 
over multiple rounds, and if there is a fixed cost it matters for the payment they expect from the 
experimenter. One should therefore expect that subjects trade at a price further away from the 
Walrasian equilibrium if there is a fixed cost. This expectation holds true in the data from the 
gross sample. In line with this, with no fixed cost, the normalised mean deviation from the Nash 
equilibrium is negative. If there is a fixed cost, the mean deviation becomes positive. Apparently, 
subjects do not decide in a purely forward-looking manner.  
 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
no fixed cost  32,2363184 36,2569986 408 0  0
fixed cost  58,4285714 53,5142452 102    
 
Table 5 
Fixed  Cost: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(data on ordinary coverage insignificant; no treatment data available) 
 
gross  CN  CN (SD)  CN NOS  CN ANOVA 
CN Mann-
Whitney 
no fixed cost  -6,76489028 77,7691586 319 0,022  0
fixed cost  14,7882353 73,6943647 85    
 
Table 6 
Fixed  Cost: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data on ordinary coverage insignificant; no treatment data available 
data on NN index from gross and ordinary coverage samples insignificant, from treatment sample not 
available) 
 
3.  Effect of Constrained Capacity 
If sellers compete in price, if products are homogeneous, and if marginal cost is constant, the 
mere presence of a second seller suffices to force the competitive equilibrium on the sellers. This 
is in essence the result of (Bertrand 1883). In the literature, this result is typically referred to as 
the “Bertrand paradox“ (e.g. Tirole 1988:210). Among the many attempts to dissolve the para-
dox, the first had been to introduce capacity constraints (Edgeworth 1897). Theory then expects 
positive profits. The experimental data stands in harsh opposition to the expectation. If capacity 
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gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
unconstrained 54,0912698  38,9772076 252 0  0
constrained 16,8590308  32,7397548 227    
ordinary cov-




unconstrained 42,5  24,2806826 98 0  0
constrained 6,38607595  26,1501604 158    
 
Table 7 
Capacity: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(no treatment data available) 
 
 
gross  CN  CN (SD)  CN NOS  CN ANOVA 
CN Mann-
Whitney 
unconstrained 0,38174274  59,6220345 241 0,41  0,769
constrained -6,09202454  97,9236166 163    
ordinary cov-




unconstrained 5,64516129  33,9112157 93 0,028  0
constrained -20,2340426  107,531583 94    
 
Table 8 
Capacity: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(no treatment data available) 
 
 
gross  NN  NN (SD)  NN NOS  NN ANOVA 
NN Mann-
Whitney 
unconstrained 58,1631799  252,777783 239 0,044  0,421
constrained 15,2702703  70,1011509 148    
ordinary cov-




unconstrained 130,43956  396,327031 91 0,004  0,001
constrained 5,625  74,1055961 88    
 
Table 9 
Capacity: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(no treatment data available) 
 
Interaction effects make it possible to say more about the underlying forces. Most graphic is the 
interaction with market size. In duopoly, the constraint only has a small (negative) effect on the 
deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium. The effect becomes a bit more pronounced in triopoly, 
and is strong in larger markets. In asymmetric markets, the negative effect of a capacity con-
straint on deviations from the Walrasian equilibrium is much more pronounced than in symmet-
ric markets. Likewise, the negative effect is stronger in sequential than in simultaneous interac-
tion. Collusion in homogeneous markets is dampened much more by a capacity constraint than 
when subjects trade in substitutes. Finally, a capacity constraint reduces collusion with all speci-
fications of ex ante information, but the reduction is much stronger with reduced ex ante infor-
mation.   12
size  size 2  size 2 (SD)  size 2 NOS  size Sig. 
unconstrained 62,5733333 40,6232232 150  0,07080032
constrained 59,1538462 22,3712842 13   
  size 3  size 3 (SD)  size 3 NOS   
unconstrained 48,8484848 32,913828 33   
constrained 38,2826087 35,8029565 46   
  size 4  size 4 (SD)  size 4 NOS   
unconstrained 40,53125 36,5892496 32   





reduced ex ante 
(SD) 
reduced ex ante 
NOS  ex ante Sig. 
unconstrained 71,56 45,9547604 25 0
constrained 7,20792079 25,3957937 101   
  partial ex ante  partial ex ante (SD)  partial ex ante NOS 
unconstrained 44,5 24,63737 52   
constrained 29,6578947 38,2532643 38   
  full ex ante  full ex ante (SD)  full ex ante NOS 
unconstrained 57,738255 41,5450579 149   
constrained 28,7741935 36,0820451 31   
symmetry  symmetry symmetry  (SD) symmetry NOS  symmetry Sig. 
unconstrained 50,345 40,3647437 200  0,00131709
constrained 19,573913 36,7657499 115   
  asymmetry  asymmetry (SD)  asymmetry NOS 
unconstrained 68,5 29,2014638 52   
constrained 14,0714286 27,90483 112   
homogeneity  homogeneous  homogeneous (SD) homogeneous NOS 
homogeneity 
Sig. 
unconstrained 48,3903743 41,2493403 187   
constrained 13,7 31,2028477 210  0
 heterogeneous
heterogeneous 
(SD)  heterogeneous NOS 
unconstrained 70,4923077 25,3975411 65   
constrained 55,8823529 25,9540034 17   
 
Table 10 
Capacity: Interaction Effects 
(deviations from the Walrasian equilibrium) 
 
4.  Effect of Advance Production 
Theory expects a similar outcome if sellers ultimately compete in price, but have a chance to 
precommit on quantity. They then play a game of two stages that yields results similar to quan-
tity competition, i.e. a price substantially above the expectation of the Bertrand model (Kreps 
and Scheinkman 1983; but see Davidson and Deneckere 1986). If subjects must produce a per-
ishable commodity in advance, this is a way to implement the setting in the laboratory. Here, 
results are less impressive than with capacity constraints. The only result significant at the 5% 
level is in the treatment sample, and with respect to the NN index. As with capacity constraints, 
however, collusion is reduced, not increased by the manipulation. Qualitatively, the treatment 
sample reaches the same result with respect to the CN index, but it is only weakly significant.   13
  







tion  42,3333333 26,5847701 9 0,15124064 0,118
advance production  22,75 31,7722721 12    
 
Table 11 
Advance Production: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(data from gross and ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
 
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA 
T CN Mann 
Whitney 
no advance produc-
tion  4 30,1454806 9 0,08337275 0,088
advance production  -29,75 48,6698058 12    
 
Table 12 
Advance Production: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(all other data insignificant) 
 
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA 
T NN Mann 
Whitney 
no advance produc-
tion 3,66666667 8,51469318 9 0,04223725  0,025
advance production  -5,25 9,80839158 12    
 
Table 13 
Advance Production: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(all other data insignificant) 
 
5.  Collusion when Process Innovation is Possible 
Do subjects collude more if they have a chance for a process innovation that reduces cost for 
them, but not for their competitors? There is no significant data with respect to the Nash equilib-
rium. With respect to the Walrasian equilibrium, the effect is significant and pronounced. The 
opportunity to invest in cost reduction leads to substantially more collusion. The fact that there is 
no significance in the sample reduced to experiments with ordinary coverage has a simple expla-
nation. From 26 experiments with a chance to innovate only two are in the reduced sample. 
 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
no innovation  34,9359823  36,5078226 453 0,001  0,159
innovation 62,7692308  81,8873898 26    
 
Table 14 
Innovation: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(data from ordinary coverage sample insignificant, no treatment data on this index 
data on CN and NN indices insignificant, no treatment data on these indices)   14
IV.  Dependence of Collusion on Market Characteristics 
1.  Effect of Market Size 
Most independent variables in this data set are dichotomous or categorical. One of the major ex-
ceptions is market size. One may wonder whether, in a strict sense, this is a cardinal variable. 
But it at any rate is ordinal, which makes a linear regression meaningful. With respect to devia-
tions from the Walrasian equilibrium, it is highly significant, and it has the expected result. The 
larger the market, the smaller the degree of collusion. With respect to deviations from the Nash 
equilibrium, only the NN index leads to a significant result, and only if one reduces the sample to 
experiments that explicitly tested for market size. The effect is also negative, but much less so 
than with the Walrasian equilibrium. In the treatment data, the effect of size on the CN index is 
even smaller, but still negative. This result, however, is not significant. 
 
gross  CW B  CW B SD  CW Beta  CW Sig. 
 -4,42037497 0,61463467 -0,31277205 0
  CW Const  CW Const SD  CW Const Sig 
 53,7129887 2,97988296   0
 CW  R^2  CW  adj.R^2     
 0,09782636 0,09593501    
ordinary coverage  OC CW B  OC CW B SD  OC CW Beta  OC CW Sig. 
 -2,19592089 0,53092697 -0,2511955 0
 
OC CW 
Const  OC CW Const SD  OC CW Const Sig 
 30,5386279 3,12131327   0
  OC CW R^2 OC CW adj.R^2   
 0,063 0,059    
treatment  T CW B  T CW B SD  T CW Beta  T CW Sig. 
 -4,40960208 1,08323964 -0,35091268 0
  T CW Const  T CW Const SD  T CW Const Sig 
 59,636808 4,9777975   0
  T CW R^2  T CW adj.R^2   




Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium: Regression 
(Legend: CW: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
SD: Standard Deviation 
  NOS: Numbers of Observations 
B: B Value 
Beta: normalized B Value 
Sig: Significance Level 
Const: Constante 
R^2: R Square 
adj. R^2: adjusted R Square 
OC: sample reduced to experiments with Ordinary Coverage 
T: sample reduced to experiments where homogeneity was a Treatment variable) 
   15
 
treatment  T CN B  T CN B SD  T CN Beta  T CN Sig. 
 -2,40376305  2,5122409 -0,09386209 0,34089841 
  T CN Const  T CN Const SD  T CN Const Sig 
 17,3645249  11,5099233   0,13444788 




Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium: Regression 
(Legend: CN: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
data from the gross and ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
 
 
treatment  T NN B  T NN B SD  T NN Beta  T NN Sig. 
 -4,98615508  2,57577325 -0,19480297 0,05586649 
  T NN Const  T NN Const SD  T NN Const Sig 
 52,5256509  11,9103942   0 
  T NN R^2  T NN adj.R^2     




Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium: Regression 
(Legend: NN: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equlibrium 




“Four are few, and six are many”, game theorists say (Selten 1973). “Two are few, and four 
are many”, experimentalists claim (Huck, Normann et al. 2004). It therefore makes sense to also 
look at outcomes for individual market sizes. If one looks at the gross data, and at the deviation 
from the Walrasian equilibrium, theory seems to get it right. While the degree of collusion in 
quadropoly is much smaller than in triopoly, it again goes up to almost the level of triopoly in a 
market of five. In markets of 6,7 and 8, the deviation is much smaller. However, the picture is far 
from clear. In markets of 10 and 16, the deviation is again remarkable.  
The CN index supports the experimentalist view. There is a positive deviation in duopoly and 
triopoly, and a negative deviation in markets of 4 and 5. However, that finding too is not totally 








   16






size 2  62,3006135  39,4430571 163 0  0 
size 3  42,6962025  34,8061866 79    
size 4  14,5915493  33,5766626 142    
size 5  37,95  30,7989662 20    
size 6  18,0540541  28,2527737 37    
size 7  1  13,7840488 6    
size 8  14,9473684  25,9325486 19    
size 10  26  .  1    
size 11  8,5  1,73205081 4    
size 16  38  32,5269119 2    
size 22  6,75  29,0789156 4    
size 25  -11  14,1421356 2    
 
Table 18 
Individual Market Size 
Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(gross data only; ordinary coverage data and treatment data is also significant at the 0,000 level, and 
shows the same qualitative picture) 
 
 




size 2  31,4240506 143,836438 158 0,021  0,003 
size 3  65,8636364 234,862637 66    
size 4  26,53 160,645004 100    
size 5  -4,3125 12,3758838 16    
size 6  260,4375 620,428881 16    
size 7  -13,6666667 13,2035349 3    
size 8  11,7333333 21,7139411 15    
size 10  2 .  1    
size 11  -3,5 1,91485422 4    
size 16  -6 0 2    
size 22  -0,25 2,21735578 4    
size 25  -6 4,24264069 2    
 
Table 19 
Individual Market Size 
Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(gross data only; CN index is insignificant)   17
2.  Symmetry vs. Asymmetry of Sellers 
In the view of antitrust authorities, when assessing the opportunities for tacit collusion, symme-
try is a crucial factor.
9 The experimental evidence is more nuanced. This might be due to the fact 
that symmetry facilitates imitation, which increases competitive pressure. In the gross sample, 
asymmetry has little effect on the deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium. It is stronger if one 
reduces the sample to experiments with ordinary coverage, but it almost disappears in those ex-
periments that explicitly tested for symmetry (and is not significant). The deviation from the 
Nash equilibrium is much clearer, and in line with what antitrust authorities think. But it is (in 
ordinary coverage only weakly) significant only with respect to the NN index. The CN index is 
weakly significant only for the experiments that had symmetry as a treatment variable. 
 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
symmetry 39,1111111  41,7554722 315 0,0465909  0,015
asymmetry 31,3292683  37,9801546 164    
ordinary cover-








symmetry 27,2484472  32,8722967 161 0  0
asymmetry 8,28421053  22,8434371 95    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA   
symmetry 72,2222222  25,1713085 18 0,90811584  0,752
asymmetry 71,2631579  30,4681351 38    
 
Table 20 
Symmetry: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
 
 
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA 
T CN Mann 
Whitney 
symmetry 18,7727273  68,5405211 22 0,09588123 0,047
asymmetry 
-




Symmetry: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 










                                        
9   Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Division, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
of September 10, 1992, 57 FR 41552, Section 2.11; ECJ of First Instance Case T-102/96, Gencor v Com-
mission, [1999] ECR II-753, paragraph 222; EC Commission Decision 92/553/EC in Case IV/M.190 — 
Nestlé/Perrier, OJ L 356, 5.12.1992, p. 1, points 63-123.   18
gross  NN  NN (SD)  NN NOS  NN ANOVA 
NN Mann-
Whitney 
symmetry 55,3498233  236,903865 283 0,03062506  0,026
asymmetry 4,77884615  27,2756361 104    
ordinary coverage  OC NN  OC NN (SD) OC NN NOS OC NN ANOVA   
symmetry 92,4592593  334,671632 135 0,06154268  0,002
asymmetry -2,65909091  7,72173972 44    
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA   
symmetry 44,3888889  79,4859506 18 0,02969758  0,176
asymmetry 8,81578947  40,2511408 38    
 
Table 22 
Symmetry: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
 
Again, interaction effects help to understand the somewhat mixed evidence. It is particularly in-
teresting to test for interactions with market size. Asymmetry increases collusion in markets of 2 
and 3, but reduces it in larger markets. Moreover, symmetry hurts if gains from collusion are 
small, but it helps if there is a larger pie. 
 
size  size 2  size 2 (SD)  size 2 NOS  size Sig. 
symmetry 59,3082707  42,1597216 133  0,00060183
asymmetry 75,5666667  19,4221405 30   
  size 3  size 3 (SD)  size 3 NOS   
symmetry 33,4418605  29,2023338 43   
asymmetry 53,75  38,0213286 36   
  size 4  size 4 (SD)  size 4 NOS   
symmetry 18,626506  37,6708177 83   
asymmetry 8,91525424  26,0452445 59   
  size 5  size 5 (SD)  size 5 NOS   
symmetry 51  33,4932829 11   
asymmetry 22  18,1727818 9   
surplus  producer surplus  producer surplus (SD)  producer surplus NOS  surplus Sig.
symmetry -18,375  38,9539563 8  0,00137745
asymmetry 25,1176471  30,7284118 17   
  symmetric surplus  symmetric surplus (SD)  symmetric surplus NOS 
symmetry 27,6981132  33,1364193 106   
asymmetry 3,34615385  17,7153996 26   
  consumer surplus  consumer surplus (SD)  consumer surplus NOS 
symmetry 48,5103093  43,0939737 194   
asymmetry 38,214876  39,3086518 121   
 
Table 23 
Symmetry: Interaction Effects 
(normalized deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium) 
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3.  fect of Power Asymmetries among Sellers 
Symmetry addresses relative gains from collusion, whereas power says something about bargain-
ing weights when it comes to (implicit) negotiations about how to split these gains. In experi-
ments, power is typically implemented by giving some, but not all sellers inframarginal units. 
These sellers then can exert influence on their competitors by withholding supply.
10 
The effect of power on deviations from the Walrasian equilibrium is insignificant throughout, as 
is the effect on proportional deviations from the Nash equilibrium. However, the effect on the 
CN index is highly significant. The effect is not surprising. If some sellers have power, this 
pushes the equilibrium far below the Nash prediction. 
 
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA 
T CW Mann 
Whitney 
no power  56,8571429  28,3162413 7 0,13489024  0,241
power 71,8461539  14,9935884 13    
 
Table 24 
Power: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(data from the gross and ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
 
 
gross  CN  CN (SD)  CN NOS  CN ANOVA 
CN Mann-
Whitney 
no power  4,58933333  49,6103738 375 0  0,023
power -90,4137931  211,052552 29    
ordinary coverage  OC CN  OC CN (SD)  OC CN NOS OC CN ANOVA   
no power  -0,62857143  32,9936303 175 0  0,363
power -105,583333  285,93593 12    
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA   
no power  18,2857143  21,2423656 7 0,21427761  0,485
power -38,8461539  114,962201 13    
 
Table 25 
Power: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
 
 
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA 
T NN Mann 
Whitney 
no power  5,57142857  5,38074167 7 0,77904285  0,485
power 4,30769231  10,9497688 13    
 
Table 26 
Power: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the gross and ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
 
 
                                        
10   Of course, this also generate asymmetry among sellers. But asymmetry is the wider category. It in particular 
also covers mere cost asymmetry.   20
V.  Dependence of Collusion on Demand and Supply Characteristics 
1.  Effect of Demand Characteristics 
From a theoretical perspective, the shape of the demand curve matters since it is the upper bound 
of the bargaining range. Most experiments use a linear demand curve with negative slope. Fre-
quently, there is also a step function that could be approximated by such a linear curve. Occa-
sionally more complicated, e.g. quadratic, specifications are used. All this is presented here as 
demand decreasing in quantity. It is opposed to constant demand. In such a box design, it would 
in principle be possible for the sellers to appropriate the entire consumer rent. 
The effect of this manipulation on the deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium is significant 
only if one reduces the sample to experiments with ordinary coverage. It has the expected direc-
tion. Collusion is much higher if demand is constant. Likewise, the mean deviation from the 
Nash equilibrium is negative, both measured by the CN and the NN index, if demand decreases 
in quantity. It is positive with constant demand. 
 
ordinary  
coverage  OC CW  OC CW (SD)  OC CW NOS 
OC CW  
ANOVA 
OC CW Mann 
Whitney 
constant demand  38,8979592  22,79825 49 0  0
decreasing demand  15,4852941  31,0628598 204    
 
Table 27 
Demand: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(data from the gross sample insignificant, no treatment data available) 
 
 
ordinary coverage  OC CN  OC CN (SD)  OC CN NOS 
OC CN ANO-
VA 
OC CN Mann 
Whitney 
constant demand  20,6818182  19,0321304 44 0,00672669  0
decreasing demand  -17,1214286  90,6806768 140    
 
Table 28 
Demand: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the gross sample insignificant, no treatment data available) 
 
 
gross  NN  NN (SD)  NN NOS  NN ANOVA 
NN Mann-
Whitney 
constant demand  234,923077  501,455953 52 0  0
decreasing demand  11,9329268  56,1681215 328    
ordinary coverage  OC NN  OC NN (SD) OC NN NOS OC NN ANOVA   
constant demand  288,214286  545,357101 42 0  0
decreasing demand  1,74626866  60,2104938 134    
 
Table 29 
Demand: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(no treatment data available) 
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2.  Effect of Supply Characteristics 
In practice, supply curves often have negative slope. There are, however, no experiments that 
have tested such a market. In most experiments, marginal cost and hence supply is constant. In 
many others, marginal cost increases in quantity, meaning that supply decreases in quantity. 
From a theoretical perspective, the supply curve is the lower bound of the bargaining range. If 
supply decreases in quantity, sellers have less to gain from collusion. This expectation is borne 
out by all data in all samples and with respect to all indices. 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
constant supply  53,4411765  39,2385579 272 0  0
decreasing supply  14,01  30,7082216 200    




constant supply  42,4680851  23,9787998 94 0  0
decreasing supply  6,74842767  26,8179443 159    




constant supply  72,3333333  19,8051111 12 0  0
decreasing supply  17,1785714  39,1086365 28    
 
Table 30 
Supply: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
 
 





constant supply  8,23595506 26,2877531 89 0,00797099  0
decreasing supply  -23,3684211 108,161823 95    
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA   
constant supply  59,0833333 36,807752 12 0  0
decreasing supply  -3,16666667 30,6483854 18    
 
Table 31 
Supply: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the gross sample insignificant) 
 
 
gross  NN  NN (SD)  NN NOS  NN ANOVA 
NN Mann-
Whitney 
constant supply  59,3474904  243,925716 259 0,01911447  0
decreasing supply  6,27272727  64,8458428 121    
ordinary coverage  OC NN  OC NN (SD) OC NN NOS OC NN ANOVA   
constant supply  137,103448  404,165089 87 0,0027215  0
decreasing supply  4,61797753  73,8609728 89    
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA   
constant supply  94  100,08451 12 0,00063051  0
decreasing supply  2,72222222  13,813061 18    
 
Table 32 
Supply: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium   22
3.  Dependence of Collusion on the Distribution of the Surplus 
 
While demand and supply say something about the upper and lower bound of the bargaining 
range, surplus directly measures how much sellers have to gain from collusion. If most of the 
surplus is with producers anyhow, gains from collusion are small. If, in the Walrasian equilib-
rium, the distribution of the surplus is symmetric, collusion pays more. It is most profitable if, 
under perfect competition, most of the surplus would go to consumers. As the data shows, sub-
jects are highly sensitive to this with respect to all three indices. The treatment data is insignifi-




gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Kruskal-
Wallis 
producer surplus  11,2  38,7405903 25 0  0
symmetric surplus  22,9015152  32,1636701 132    
consumer surplus  44,5555556  41,9180949 315    
ordinary cover-
age  OC CW  OC CW (SD)  OC CW NOS  OC CW ANOVA 
 
producer surplus  0,55  35,0690672 20 0,00358389  0,008
symmetric surplus  18,0485437  32,0873131 103    
consumer surplus  24,5769231  28,313545 130    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA   
producer surplus  -0,64285714  36,6639776 14 0,85851372  0,865
symmetric surplus  2,5  16,2326831 6    
consumer surplus  4,27586207  23,5719212 29    
 
Table 33 
Surplus: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
 
 
gross  CN  CN (SD)  CN NOS  CN ANOVA 
CN Kruskal-
Wallis 
producer surplus  -84,0952381  215,527702 21 0  0,003
symmetric surplus  -1,34375  61,5337012 96    
consumer surplus  3,11267606  58,4937674 284    
ordinary coverage  OC CN  OC CN (SD)  OC CN NOS OC CN ANOVA   
producer surplus  -113,5625  240,771252 16 0  0
symmetric surplus  8,23287671  25,4288335 73    
consumer surplus  -2,85263158  30,9852293 95    
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA   
producer surplus  -141,454546  288,010196 11 0,29050078  0,034
symmetric surplus  2,5  16,2326831 6    
consumer surplus  4,8  18,8069136 5    
 
Table 34 
Surplus: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
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gross  NN  NN (SD)  NN NOS  NN ANOVA 
NN Kruskal-
Wallis 
producer surplus  -26,0476191  53,5504213 21 0  0
symmetric surplus  158,071429  410,884054 84    
consumer surplus  12,36  44,7012533 275    
ordinary coverage  OC NN  OC NN (SD)  OC NN NOS OC NN ANOVA   
producer surplus  -34,9375  58,8687452 16 0  0
symmetric surplus  199,030769  459,373281 65    
consumer surplus  -0,41052632  11,9764794 95    
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA   
producer surplus  -48  67,690472 11 0,10540691  0,083
symmetric surplus  -1  5,65685425 6    
consumer surplus  -0,4  2,07364414 5    
 
Table 35 
Surplus: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
 
VI.  Dependence of Collusion on Seller Characteristics 
 
One of the standard defences of the rational choice approach is this: well yes, not everybody be-
haves like homo oeconomicus. But if you give them some chance to practise, they will (cf. e.g. 
Friedman 1953). The experimental evidence is at best mixed. If measured against the Walrasian 
equilibrium, experienced subjects collude less. This may be read as evidence for the learning 
expectation. But if one compares behaviour to the Nash equilibrium, experienced subjects col-
lude substantially more. Apparently, they learn to collude, not to play Nash. One might object 
that the benchmark is taken from one shot interaction. In line with the folk theorem, collusion is 
an equilibrium in the repeated game with uncertain duration (Aumann and Shapley 1994). If that 
were the reason, however, one would have to see a strong interaction effect with the treatment 
variable partner versus stranger design. This is not the case. Both with the CN and the NN index, 
the interaction effect is insignificant (p=0,933 in both cases). 
 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
no experience  38,1138614  41,3056982 404 0,03701152  0,022
experience 27,4666667  35,7106742 75    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA   
no experience  26,9122807  38,9960074 57 0,61063109  0,735
experience 30,6981132  38,695351 53    
 
Table 36 
Experience: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
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gross  CN  CN (SD)  CN NOS  CN ANOVA 
CN Mann-
Whitney 
no experience  -4,85344828  81,6491321 348 0,08925335  0,059
experience 14,0714286  38,1546409 56    
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS T CN ANOVA   
no experience  4,825  53,2184118 40 0,26124052  0,475
experience 17,2972973  42,341774 37    
 
Table 37 
Experience: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the ordinary coverage sample insignificant) 
 
 
gross  NN  NN (SD)  NN NOS  NN ANOVA 
NN Mann-
Whitney 
no experience  32,505988  178,492835 334 0,02504473  0,005
experience 100,075472  318,645502 53    
ordinary coverage  OC NN  OC NN (SD) OC NN NOS OC NN ANOVA   
no experience  51,5324675  256,367031 154 0,04667632  0,115
experience 177,16  452,596737 25    
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA   
no experience  27,55  63,2114685 40 0,85198341  0,527
experience 25,1081081  49,8240146 37    
 
Table 38 
Experience: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
 
 
VII.  Role of Seller Interaction in Explaining Collusion 
1.  Dependence on the Strategic Variable 
If sellers compete in price, if the product is homogeneous, and if marginal cost is constant, the 
Bertrand model expects the competitive equilibrium (Bertrand 1883). If they compete in quan-
tity, a deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium is expected, the larger the smaller the market 
(Cournot 1838). These expectations are only partly borne out by the experimental evidence. 
There is indeed a larger deviation from the competitive equilibrium if quantity is the strategic 
variable. If they compete in quantity, sellers end up close to or even below the Nash equilibrium. 
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gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
quantity 49,4251969  31,1895179 127 0  0
price 30,3579882  36,7079129 338    
ordinary coverage  OC CW  OC CW (SD)  OC CW NOS OC CW ANOVA   
quantity 37,9090909  26,4599901 44 0  0
price 16,6220096  30,7376569 209    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA   
quantity 57,7619048  23,5688455 21 0,48151018  0,743
price 51,3636364  34,2463699 22    
 
Table 39 
Strategic Variable: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
 
 
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA 
T CN Mann 
Whitney 
quantity -21,952381  56,2463121 21 0,00856131  0,006
price 18,1818182  37,6369074 22    
 
Table 40 
Strategic Variable: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the gross and the ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
 
 
gross  NN  NN (SD)  NN NOS  NN ANOVA 
NN Mann-
Whitney 
quantity -1,2519685  16,2529453 127 0,00321872  0
price 65,1048387  251,755322 248   
ordinary coverage  OC NN  OC NN (SD) OC NN NOS OC NN ANOVA   
quantity -3,38636364  10,9123696 44 0,05595721  0,003
price 94,8863636  338,062613 132   
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA   
quantity -5,28571429  13,5319727 21 0,0242377  0,001
price 20,5  48,7136922 22    
 
Table 41 
Strategic Variable: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
 
Specifically when sellers compete in price, game theoretic models make a difference between 
constant and increasing marginal cost (Allen and Hellwig 1986b; Allen and Hellwig 1986a). If 
this is relevant for the behaviour of experimental subjects, there would have to be an interaction 
effect between the strategic variable and the distinction between constant and increasing supply. 
If measured with the CN or the NN index, this is not the case (p=0,767 and 0,104 respectively). 
If measured with the CW index, there is indeed an interaction effect. But it points into the oppo-
site direction. If marginal cost increases, collusion decreases, instead of increasing, as theory 
predicts. 
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  constant  constant (SD)  constant NOS  supply Sig. 
quantity 55,1666667  30,83018 90 0,00232913 
price 50,7777778  31,4432781 171  
  decreasing  decreasing (SD)  decreasing NOS 
quantity 35,3823529  28,9346334 34  
price 9,61349693  29,5284598 163  
 
Table 42 
Strategic Variable – Supply Interaction 
(normalized deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium) 
 
 
2.  Simultaneous vs. Sequential Interaction 
If sellers interact sequentially (and if products are homogeneous), theory predicts a smaller de-
viation from the Walrasian equilibrium if they compete in quantity (Stackelberg 1934). If they 
compete in price and marginal cost is constant, there should be no deviation from the Walrasian 
equilibrium. The evidence that does not distinguish between strategic variables does not support 
these predictions. Sequential interaction increases the deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium, 
whereas from the theoretical perspective it could at most have been immaterial. The CN and the 
NN indices do not yield significant results. 
 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
simultaneous 35,0047506  36,6532656 421 0,03624041  0,419
sequential 46,9137931  61,7917511 58    
ordinary coverage  OC CW  OC CW (SD)  OC CW NOS OC CW ANOVA   
simultaneous 18,7161572  30,4039002 229 0,02388349  0,097
sequential 32,8888889  32,7100706 27    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA   
simultaneous 66  26,8374738 9 0,72587447  0,760
sequential 69,125  17,3354165 16    
 
Table 43 
Sequence: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
 
 
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA 
T CN Mann 
Whitney 
simultaneous 14,2222222  20,8553217 9 0,15505034  0,462
sequential -37,0625  102,540703 16    
 
Table 44 
Sequence: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the gross and the ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
 
 
   27
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS T NN ANOVA  T NN Mann Whitney 
simultaneous 3,44444444 4,21637021 9 0,44874205  0,691
sequential 1,125  8,39742024 16    
 
Table 45 
Sequence: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the gross and the ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
 
If one looks at interaction effects, theory does not fare better. Here, the CN index is significant. 
But in quantity competition, there is a negative deviation from the Nash equilibrium if interac-
tion is simultaneous. The deviation becomes positive if interaction is sequential. The negative 
effect of sequential play is even stronger in price competition. Apparently subjects dislike the 
opportunity for asymmetric gains inherent in sequential interaction. 
 
  quantity  quantity (SD)  quantity NOS  strategic variable Sig. 
simultaneous -6,37962963 56,0348219 108 0,04859943
sequential 11,2105263  29,6771123 19  
  price  price (SD)  price NOS   
simultaneous 1,78991597  87,1664467 238  




Sequence – Strategic Variable Interaction 
(normalised deviation from the Nash equilibrium) 
 
3.  Duration of the Interaction between Sellers  
Strictly speaking, theory does not predict that longer duration means more collusion. If subjects 
are informed about the exact duration, via backwards induction, the prisoner's dilemma from the 
one-shot game is re-established (Selten 1978). If the end is uncertain, according to the folk theo-
rem, there are multiple equilibria (Aumann and Shapley 1994). However, if one allows for a 
small deviation from strict rationality, and if the discount factor is not too large, a longer shadow 
of the future makes collusion more attractive (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole 1991:146-150). This 
expectation is at best weakly supported by the experimental evidence. If one restricts the sample 
to experiments with ordinary coverage, a linear regression yields a significant result for the CW 
and the NN indices. It indeed supports the view that longer duration increases collusion. One 
should, however, be aware of a qualification. Time series evidence demonstrates that collusion 
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gross  CW B  CW B SD  CW Beta  CW Sig. 
 0,20048684 0,11456625 0,08988223 0,0809402
  CW Const  CW Const SD  CW Const Sig 
 38,3053538 3,5195464   0
 CW  R^2  CW  adj.R^2     
 0,00807882 0,00544073    
ordinary coverage  OC CW B  OC CW B SD  OC CW Beta  OC CW Sig. 
 0,45946574 0,13504525 0,24908425 0,00082811
  OC CW Const OC CW Const SD  OC CW Const Sig 
 16,2235714 3,46183856   0
  OC CW R^2  OC CW adj.R^2   
 0,06204296 0,05668321    
treatment  T CW B  T CW B SD  T CW Beta  T CW Sig. 
 -0,29934652 0,30796074 -0,14832808 0,33660159
  T CW Const  T CW Const SD  T CW Const Sig 
 63,8339001 7,47471927   0
  T CW R^2  T CW adj.R^2   
 0,02200122 -0,00128447    
Table 47 
Duration: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium: Regression 
 
treatment  T CN B  T CN B SD  T CN Beta  T CN Sig. 
 1,23323459 0,90890613 0,20492099 0,18208216 
  T CN Const  T CN Const SD  T CN Const Sig 
 -40,9577591 22,0606634   0,07039197 
  T CN R^2  T CN adj.R^2     
 0,04199261 0,01918291    
Table 48 
Duration: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium: Regression 
(estimates from gross and ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
 
gross  NN B  NN B SD  NN Beta  NN Sig. 
 0,994591 0,58728859 0,08700595 0,09118278
  NN Const  NN Const SD    NN Const Sig 
 18,0101709 18,0418708 0,31880353
 NN  R^2  NN  adj.R^2     
 0,00757004 0,0049306    
ordinary coverage  OC NN B  OC NN B SD  OC NN Beta  OC NN Sig. 
 4,47582732 1,36914249 0,23990213 0,00129911
  OC NN Const  OC NN Const SD  OC NN Const Sig 
 -20,4405987 35,0974968   0,5610504
  OC NN R^2  OC NN adj.R^2   
 0,05755303 0,05216762    
treatment  T NN B  T NN B SD  T NN Beta  T NN Sig. 
 0,7784434 0,39897747 0,28827953 0,05773736
  T NN Const  T NN Const SD  T NN Const Sig 
 -9,81206372 9,6838468   0,3167472
  T NN R^2  T NN adj.R^2     
 0,08310509 0,06127426    
Table 49 
Duration: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium: Regression   29
4.  Partner vs. Stranger Design 
It is more interesting, and more relevant, to compare experiments that had a fixed partner design 
with others that rematched subjects from round to round. On average, the latter manipulation 
increases collusion with respect to all three indices. 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
partner 34,5250597  42,0143085 419 0,006  0,001
stranger 49,8666667  25,682195 60    
ordinary coverage  OC CW  OC CW (SD)  OC CW NOS  OC CW ANOVA   
partner 16,7882883  30,6395664 222 0  0
stranger 42,5588235  22,2794799 34    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA   
partner 61,8421053  21,5748391 19 0,853  0,811
stranger 60,5  23,2797631 20    
 
Table 50 
Partner vs. Stranger Design 
Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
 
ordinary coverage  OC CN  OC CN (SD) OC CN NOS OC CN ANOVA 
CN Mann Whit-
ney 
partner -11,8846154  87,1616194 156 0,086  0
stranger 15,3870968  22,8599758 31    
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA   
partner -8,89473684  70,2178315 19 0,656  0,440
stranger -20,05  84,0829634 20    
 
Table 51 
Partner vs. Stranger Design 
Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(gross data insignificant) 
 
gross  NN  NN (SD)  NN NOS  NN ANOVA 
NN Mann-
Whitney 
partner 24,0684524  151,842804 336 0 0
stranger 158,313725  389,258448 51    
ordinary coverage  OC NN  OC NN (SD)  OC NN NOS  OC NN ANOVA   
partner 30,5666667  219,584581 150 0 0
stranger 268,275862  491,13243 29    
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA   
partner 13,2631579  42,6872894 19 0,523  0,704
stranger 6,35  21,4089873 20    
 
Table 52 
Partner vs. Stranger Design 
Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
 
These are surprising findings, both compared to the theoretical prediction, and to the findings in 
those experiments that had the distinction between partner and stranger design as a treatment 
variable. From the already mentioned folk theorem it follows that theory makes no clear predic-  30
tion for the repeated game (Aumann and Shapley 1994). But one result is beyond doubt. In one-
shot interaction, there is no collusive equilibrium. (Bertrand 1883) and (Cournot 1838) agree on 
this. It is equally remarkable that in the subsample with experiments that explicitly tested for the 
effect, the distinction between the partner and the stranger design is insignificant for all three 
indices.  
For understanding these findings, it is helpful to look at interaction effects. In duopoly markets, 
shifting from partner to stranger design slightly reduces collusion. The larger the market, how-
ever, the stronger the positive effect of a stranger design on the degree of collusion. Moreover, 
the effect of stranger interaction on collusion is sensitive to information. With poor ex ante in-
formation or feedback, strangers collude more than partners. With full ex ante or feedback in-
formation, the effect reverses. 
 
size  size 2  size 2 (SD)  size 2 NOS  size Sig. 
partner 64,21875 42,6758405 128  0,00531679
stranger 55,2857143 23,3535127 35   
  size 3  size 3 (SD)  size 3 NOS   
partner 42,4782609 34,2192794 69   
stranger 44,2 40,6114379 10   
  size 4  size 4 (SD)  size 4 NOS   
partner 12,9111111 33,4133914 135   
stranger 47 16,4519502 7   
ex ante informa-
tion  reduced ex ante reduced ex ante (SD) reduced ex ante NOS  ex ante Sig.
partner 18,1166667 39,8512325 120  0,04375676
stranger 57,1666667 9,66264284 6   
  partial ex ante  partial ex ante (SD)  partial ex ante NOS 
partner 37,9047619 32,7132923 84   
stranger 42,8333333 13,9773627 6   
  full ex ante  full ex ante (SD)  full ex ante NOS 
partner 53,8106061 46,1180253 132   










partner 2,53521127 28,2402099 71  0,00692665
stranger 48,6666667 21,825062 3   
  partial feedback  partial feedback (SD)  partial feedback NOS 
partner 36,0593607 36,9249318 219   
stranger 52,3793103 23,7793635 29   
  full feedback  full feedback (SD)  full feedback NOS 
partner 59,12 52,0599862 75   




Partner vs. Stranger Design: Interaction Effects 
(normalized deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium) 
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This explanation is corroborated if one checks the distribution of market sizes in the subsample 
that has explicitly tested the stranger versus the partner design. 33 experiments had a duopoly 
market, 6 a quadropoly. 27 had full, 12 partial ex ante information, none reduced information. 18 
had full and 18 partial, and only 3 reduced feedback. In the subsample, treatment variables are 
thus overrepresented that dampen the effect of a stranger design on collusion. 
5.  Effect of Communication on Collusion 
In game theoretic terms, competition puts sellers into a prisoner's dilemma.
11 If they have a 
chance to talk before play, from a theoretical perspective this is just irrelevant “cheap talk“ (for 
background and alternative models see Crawford 1998). Indeed, the main effect is not significant 
with respect to the CW and the NN indices. Only the CN index shows what common sense 
would expect: communication increases collusion. 
 
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA 
T CW Mann 
Whitney 
no communication  47,5555556  125,966376 9 0,80658175  0,042
communication 57,6153846  63,1948554 13    
 
Table 54 
Communication: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(data from gross and ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
 
 
gross  CN  CN (SD)  CN NOS  CN ANOVA 
CN Mann-
Whitney 
no communication  -4,99171271  80,3984705 362 0,0349576  0,006
communication 21,5714286  35,1374603 42    
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA   
no communication  3,11111111  21,1509128 9 0,003486  0,003
communication 45  33,4713808 13    
 
Table 55 
Communication: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from ordinary coverage sample insignificant) 
 
 
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA 
T NN Mann 
Whitney 
no communication  29,875 65,9641407 8 0,19233194  0,051
communication 116,9 170,040159 10    
 
Table 56 
Communication: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from gross and ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
 
                                        
11   Strictly speaking, this only holds if marginal cost increases. But if the supply curve differs from this, the 
parties still face a dilemma.   32
 
However, if one looks at interaction effects, the picture changes dramatically. Many of them are 
significant, and they matter in practical terms. In a duopoly, collusion, expressed as the deviation 
from the Walrasian equilibrium, is even slightly reduced. In triopoly, however, collusion jumps 
up. If sellers compete in price, communication reduces collusion. If they compete in quantity, 
communication strongly increases collusion. Inexperienced subjects slightly suffer from com-
munication. Experienced subjects may dramatically increase collusion if they are allowed to talk. 
In simultaneous interaction, communication strongly increases collusion. In sequential interac-
tion, the opposite is true. Finally with poor ex ante information, communication strongly reduces 
collusion, whereas with more ex ante information the opposite holds true, in particular with par-
tial ex ante information. With poor and with full feedback, communication increases collusion. 
With partial feedback, collusion is reduced. 
 
market size  size 2  size 2 (SD)  size 2 NOS 
market size 
Sig 
no communication  52,7755102  18,2314578 49  0,0291289
communication 22,75  28,1469359 4   
  size 3  size 3 (SD)  size 3 NOS   
no communication  19,173913  29,7071344 23   
communication 52  14,1421356 2   
  size 4  size 4 (SD)  size 4 NOS   
no communication  10,9032258  32,1024395 93   
communication 7,46153846  19,504766 13   
strategic variable  quantity  quantity (SD)  quantity NOS 
strategic vari-
able Sig. 
no communication  46,6052632  31,3782571 114  0,0009569
communication 74,1538462  14,3052796 13   
  price  price (SD  price NOS   
no communication  74,1538462  14,3052796 13   
communication 17,24  27,2752635 25   
experience  no experience  no experience (SD)  no experience NOS 
experience 
Sig. 
no communication  38,3288043  40,3590566 368  0,00539321
communication 35,9166667  50,597219 36   
  experience  experience (SD)  experience NOS 
no communication  23,5217391  34,4005851 69   
communication 72,8333333  9,74508423 6   
sequence  simultaneous  simultaneous (SD)  simulataneous N  sequence Sig.
no communication  33,9287532  36,738458 393  0,00130297
communication 50,1071429  32,3892292 28   
  sequential   sequential (SD)  sequential NOS 
no communication  54,4090909  58,1326943 44   
communication 23,3571429  69,1059467 14   
ex ante information 
ex ante re-
duced 
ex ante reduced 
(SD) 
ex ante reduced 
NOS  *ex ante Sig. 
no communication  21,3333333  41,1579446 114  0,03125792
communication 7,08333333  20,322215 12   
  ex ante partial  ex ante partial (SD)  ex ante partial NOS 
no communication  33,9480519  31,2426396 77   
communication 63,6153846  22,2917715 13     33
  ex ante full  ex ante full (SD)  ex ante full NOS 
no communication  52,1197605  39,6774347 167   








NOS *feedback  Sig.
no communication  4,15942029  29,7744577 69  0,0173197
communication 7,8  25,2922913 5   
  partial feedback  partial feedback (SD) partial feedback NOS 
no communication  39,650655  36,1609494 229   
communication 17,6842105  27,166263 19   
  full feedback  full feedback (SD)  full feedback NOS 
no communication  53,9354839  43,9032549 93   
communication 74,5  69,9082732 10   
Table 57 
Communication: Interaction Effects 
(normalized deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium) 
6.  Option to Agree 
While mere communication should be irrelevant, at least in standard settings, from a theoretical 
perspective the possibility to conclude an enforceable agreement should make all the difference. 
Against this backdrop, the experimental evidence is somewhat disappointing. Some of the indi-
ces are insignificant in some compositions of the sample. The significant results in the gross 
sample, especially with respect to the CW index, are far from impressive. 
 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
no agreement  35,6111111  39,5691423 450 0,07618281  0,277
agreement 49,4137931  53,7603925 29    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA   
no agreement  43,4444444  126,973532 9 0,59879067  0,021
agreement 71,25  76,5501703 8    
 
Table 58 
Agreement: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(data from the ordinary coverage sample insignificant) 
 
gross  CN  CN (SD)  CN NOS  CN ANOVA 
CN Mann-
Whitney 
no agreement  -4,44  79,5724605 375 0,03875631  0,001
agreement 26,3448276  24,6783246 29    
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA   
no agreement  11,6666667  47,2678538 9 0,10095232  0,016
agreement 43,25  20,2607996 8    
 
Table 59 
Agreement: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the ordinary coverage sample insignificant) 
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treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA 
T NN Mann 
Whitney 
no agreement  43,625  79,2679678 8 0,13445532  0,079
agreement 182  225,985619 5    
 
Table 60 
Agreement: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the gross and ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
 
As with communication, the many significant interaction effects are of greater interest. In du-
opoly, agreement matters most. In triopoly it still increases collusion remarkably. In quadropoly, 
however, the chance to agree even reduces collusion, as measured with the CW index. If buyers 
are simulated by a price taking computer, the effect of an opportunity to agree on collusion is 
much stronger than with human buyers. The chance to agree strongly increases collusion if sell-
ers compete in quantity; it reduces collusion if they compete in price. Experienced subjects make 
much better use of the opportunity to conclude an agreement. If interaction is simultaneous, the 
opportunity to agree helps. If interaction is sequential, it hurts. If sellers are symmetric, agree-
ment has a strong positive effect on collusion. Asymmetry dampens the effect strongly. If capac-
ity is unconstrained, the effect of a chance to agree on collusion is much stronger than with con-
strained capacity. Finally, the effect of an agreement opportunity is sensitive to the information 
environment. If ex ante information is reduced, collusion even decreases. If ex ante information 
is partial, the effect is mildly positive. It is strongly positive with full ex ante information. Full 
feedback has a similar effect. However, in feedback, the chance to agree has a negative effect in 
the partial, not in the reduced specification. 
 
market size  size 2  size 2 (SD)  size 2 NOS  size Sig 
no agreement  60,7484277  36,766793 159  0,00052927
agreement 124  87,2505969 4   
  size 3  size 3 (SD)  size 3 NOS   
no agreement  37,8059701  34,9550529 67   
agreement 70  17,3310022 12   
  size 4  size 4 (SD)  size 4 NOS   
no agreement  15,3100775  34,6488633 129   
agreement 7,46153846  19,504766 13   
computer/human 
buyer  computer computer  (SD)  computer  NOS 
computer/human buy-
er Sig. 
no agreement  41,3007916  38,7223091 379  0,0079757
agreement 88,3571429  49,0174335 14   
  human  human (SD)  human NOS   
no agreement  5,23943662  28,9000567 71   
agreement 13,0666667  24,8437019 15   
strategic variable  quantity quantity  (SD)  quantity NOS  stratvar Sig. 
no agreement  46,6034483  31,1199305 116  0,00066389
agreement 79,1818182  7,31871822 11   
  price  price (SD  price NOS   
no agreement  31,1180124  37,0472257 322   
agreement 15,0625  25,2941858 16     35




NOS  experience Sig. 
no agreement  37,6754617  40,1549605 379  0,03623788
agreement 44,76  56,6092454 25   
  experience  experience (SD)  experience NOS 
no agreement  24,5915493  34,4912318 71   
agreement 78,5  5,44671155 4   
sequence  simultaneous  simultaneous (SD) simultaneous NOS  sequence Sig. 
no agreement  33,7054455  36,5721676 404  0
agreement 65,8823529  22,8333154 17   
 sequential  sequential  (SD)  sequential  NOS 
no agreement  52,3478261  57,6642456 46   
agreement 26,0833333  74,7364562 12   
symmetry  symmetric  symmetric (SD)  symmetric NOS  symmetry Sig. 
no agreement  38,0614887  40,1913375 309  0,01223149
agreement 93,1666667  80,0834981 6   
 asymmetric  asymmetric (SD)  asymmetric NOS 
no agreement  30,2411348  37,7548295 141   
agreement 38  39,5290457 23   




NOS capacity  Sig. 
no agreement  52,8299595  37,0413337 247  0,01611412
agreement 116,4  77,4486927 5   
  constrained  constrained (SD)  constrained NOS 
no agreement  14,6600985  31,7120044 203   





ex ante reduced 
(SD) 
ex ante reduced 
NOS  ex ante Sig. 
no agreement  21,3333333  41,1579446 114  0
agreement 7,08333333  20,322215 12   
  ex ante partial 
ex ante partial 
(SD)  ex ante partial NOS 
no agreement  34,2948718  31,1898706 78   
agreement 63,8333333  23,2685247 12   
  ex ante full  ex ante full (SD)  ex ante full NOS 
no agreement  50,9314286  39,4796017 175   








NOS feedback  Sig. 
no agreement  6,44871795  30,7755374 78  0





(SD)  partial feedback NOS 
no agreement  38,942623  35,5777244 244   
agreement 13,1428571  25,7797092 14   
  full feedback  full feedback (SD)  full feedback NOS 
no agreement  52,9278351  43,524717 97   
agreement 88,3571429  49,0174335 14   
 
Table 61 
Agreement: Interaction Effects 
(normalized deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium) 
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VIII. Dependence of Collusion on the Information Environment 
1.  Role of Ex Ante Information 
From the very first oligopoly experiments on, experimenters have manipulated the information 
they have given their subjects, both in advance and as feedback to their choices in previous 
rounds (e.g. Fouraker and Siegel 1963). The effect of ex ante information on deviations from the 
Walrasian equilibrium is straightforward. The better subjects are informed, the more they col-
lude. The effect on deviations from the Nash equilibrium is less clear. The only significant find-
ing is in the sample reduced to experiments with ordinary coverage, and with respect to the NN 
index. Collusion increases from reduced to full ex ante information, but it is lowest with partial 
ex ante information. 
The distinction between full and partial ex ante information is net. If subjects are fully informed, 
they are able to calculate their competitors' profits. With partial information, they are only able to 
anticipate their own profit. The reduced information category is less strictly defined. It encom-
passes all situations where subjects receive yet less information. Often this means that they have 
no full knowledge of demand. Sometimes, there is cost uncertainty.
12 
 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Kruskal-
Wallis 
reduced ex ante information  19,9761905 39,8162709 126 0  0
partial ex ante information  38,2333333 31,7886454 90    
full ex ante information  52,75 42,0183353 180    








reduced ex ante information  7,90588235 28,3026263 85 0  0
partial ex ante information  22,6428571 28,8273426 42    
full ex ante information  36,8064516 30,2328877 62    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA   
reduced ex ante information  -4,4 32,9787811 10 0,00313307  0,002
partial ex ante information  31,5 27,6973439 8    
full ex ante information  42,2307692 28,8968102 13    
 
Table 62 
Ex ante Information: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
 
 
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS 
T CN ANO-
VA 
T CN Kruskal 
Wallis 
reduced ex ante information  -26,2 75,3713768 10 0,64802787  0,628
partial ex ante information  -17,875 24,82762 8    
full ex ante information  -5,38461539 45,2797572 13    
 
Table 63 
Ex ante Information: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the gross and ordinary coverage samples insignificant) 
                                        
12   Details are specified in the databank.   37
 





reduced ex ante infor-
mation  36,2051282 104,676238 39 0,05581643 
0,143
partial ex ante informa-
tion 5,80952381 32,7304126 42  
 
full ex ante information  124,727273 384,742986 55    
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA   
reduced ex ante infor-
mation  11,3 49,073754 10 0,69951372 
0,585
partial ex ante informa-
tion -0,25 18,3595051 8  
 
full ex ante information  19,0769231 62,9542976 13    
 
Table 64 
Ex ante Information: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the gross sample insignificant) 
 
The picture becomes much clearer if one looks at interaction effects. For markets of different 
size, ex ante information matters differently. In duopoly, collusion is highest with reduced in-
formation. It is lowest with partial information. Collusion with full information is slightly above 
collusion with partial information. The shape of the interaction curve is reversed with triopoly 
and quadropoly. Here collusion is lowest with reduced ex ante information, and highest with par-
tial information. There is also a net difference between competition in quantity and in price. With 
reduced ex ante information, collusion is much higher if subjects compete in price. This reverses 
with partial and full information. Now the deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium is higher 
with competition in quantity.  
Communication yields a similar pattern. If subjects are allowed to communicate, but severely 
lack information, they collude less than if they are better informed. With partial or full informa-
tion, however, communication strongly increases collusion. If they are allowed to conclude an 
agreement, the pattern is in principle the same. However, partial information has a less pro-
nounced impact on collusion if agreements are permitted. The situation is comparable with fixed 
cost. If ex ante information is reduced, fixed cost leads to less collusion than without fixed cost. 
With partial or full information, however, there is more collusion in fixed cost treatments. With 
asymmetry, the only noticeable difference is in full ex ante information environments. With this 
much information, subjects collude much more, whereas the level of collusion is about the same 
with reduced and partial information. If capacity is unconstrained, reduced ex ante information 
leads to very high collusion. Collusion is lowest with partial information, and somewhere in the 
middle with full information. Collusion with constrained capacity is almost the exact opposite. 
Finally, with homogeneous products, ex ante information has the standard effect. The effect re-
verses, however, if products are substitutes. 
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size  size 2  size 2 (SD)  size 2 NOS  size Sig. 
reduced 78,2  27,3406494 10  0,05778036
partial 60  23,1372715 19   
full 63,661157  42,0875187 121   
  size 3  size 3 (SD)  size 3 NOS   
reduced 41  49,6329384 15   
partial 49,5517241  26,6439302 29   
full 37,3333333  33,3439064 30   
  size 4  size 4 (SD)  size 4 NOS   
reduced 9,61643836  32,544683 73   
partial 30,6  33,3441386 20   
full 18,6  36,2014207 15   
strategic vari-
able  quantity  quantity (SD)  quantity NOS 
strategic variable 
Sig. 
reduced -16,3333333  41,4568048 6  0
partial 52,2105263  26,7340838 38   
full 55,4358974  25,6927853 78   
  price  price (SD)  price NOS   
reduced 21,907563  39,1732336 119   
partial 28,0192308  31,5118965 52   










reduced 21,3333333  41,1579446 114  0,03125792
partial 33,9480519  31,2426396 77   
full 52,1197605  39,6774347 167   
  communication  communication (SD)  communication NOS 
reduced 7,08333333  20,322215 12   
partial 63,6153846  22,2917715 13   
full 60,8461538  66,9450598 13   
agreement  no agreement  no agreement (SD)  no agreement NOS  agreement Sig. 
reduced 21,3333333  41,1579446 114  0
partial 34,2948718  31,1898706 78   
full 50,9314286  39,4796017 175   
  agreement  agreement (SD)  agreement NOS 
reduced 7,08333333  20,322215 12   
partial 63,8333333  23,2685247 12   
full 116,4  77,4486927 5   
fixed cost  no fixed cost  no fixed cost (SD)  no fixed cost NOS  fixed cost Sig. 
reduced 21,7672414  40,9543453 116  0,00079336
partial 33,4324324  31,5885713 74   
full 47,6842105  31,2845139 152   
  fixed cost  fixed cost (SD)  fixed cost NOS 
reduced -0,8  8,12130258 10   
partial 60,4375  22,3605866 16   
full 80,25  72,818712 28   
symmetry  symmetry symmetry  (SD) symmetry NOS  symmetry Sig. 
reduced 21,5689655  39,3295175 58  0,04003939
partial 39,372549  32,3276728 51   
full 49,2913907  44,1783641 151   
  asymmetry  asymmetry (SD)  asymmetry NOS 
reduced 18,6176471  40,4685356 68   
partial 36,7435897  31,42637 39     39
full 70,7586207  20,7547846 29   
capacity  unconstrained unconstrained  (SD) unconstrained NOS  capacity Sig. 
reduced 71,56  45,9547604 25  0
partial 44,5  24,63737 52   
full 57,738255  41,5450579 149   
  constrained  constrained (SD)  constrained NOS 
reduced 7,20792079  25,3957937 101   
partial 29,6578947  38,2532643 38   
full 28,7741935  36,0820451 31   
homogeneity  homogeneous  homogeneous (SD)  homogeneous NOS  homogeneity Sig. 
reduced 6,8  27,5294947 105  0
partial 32,5324675  30,6545199 77   
full 49,722973  44,4867665 148   
  heterogeneous  heterogeneous (SD)  heterogeneous NOS 
reduced 85,8571429  22,3299926 21   
partial 72  9,97496867 13   
full 66,75  23,7459674 32   
Table 65 
Ex ante Information: Interaction Effects 
(normalized deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium) 
 
2.  Role of Feedback 
At the aggregate level, ex ante and feedback information have similar effects. The deviation 
from the Walrasian equilibrium is smallest if feedback is reduced. It increases with partial feed-
back, and it is highest with full feedback. As with ex ante information, the aggregate effect on 
deviations from the Nash equilibrium is less obvious. The only weakly significant result is in the 
ordinary coverage sample. It is the same as with the Walrasian equilibrium. 
The distinction between partial and full is the same as with ex ante information. Feedback is full 
if subjects know their competitors’ profits. It is partial if they only know their own profit. Again 
the category of reduced feedback is less strictly defined. It encompasses all situations where sub-
jects get even less feedback. 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Kruskal-
Wallis 
reduced feedback  6,51898734  30,5839998 79 0  0
partial feedback  37,5426357  35,5630657 258    
full feedback  57,3963964  45,5725753 111    




reduced feedback  -0,57894737  23,274716 57 0  0
partial feedback  22,4015748  31,2651893 127    
full feedback  40,4150943  25,5150287 53    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA   
reduced feedback  5,33333333  58,7934237 6 0,1014702  0,238
partial feedback  40,0285714  38,6678813 35    
full feedback  43,7368421  31,2940216 19    
Table 66 
Feedback: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium   40
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA 
T CN Mann 
Whitney 
reduced feedback  -85,6666667  77,6908403 6 0,57446048  0,009
partial feedback  -19,7142857  171,490623 35    
full feedback  -27,4736842  76,9670697 19    
 
Table 67 
Feedback: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 




age  OC NN  OC NN (SD)  OC NN NOS OC NN ANOVA 
NN Kruskal Wal-
lis 
reduced feedback  -2,66666667  4,9244289 9 0,08515388  0,022
partial feedback  46,4867257  252,181876 113    
full feedback  156,108696  413,03711 46    
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA   
reduced feedback  -27,8333333  30,6099113 6 0,56795273  0,021
partial feedback  -6,0625  41,6505722 32    
full feedback  -3,66666667  64,9823505 18    
 
Table 68 
Feedback: Proportional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the gross sample insignificant) 
 
 
As with ex ante information, feedback is mainly relevant through its interaction with other treat-
ment variables. If buyers are human, going from reduced to partial feedback has a much smaller 
effect on collusion. If subjects are allowed to communicate, the effect of partial feedback is 
small, but the effect of full feedback is very large. The opposite is true if subjects cannot com-
municate. This pattern is even more pronounced if they are allowed to conclude an agreement. In 
a stranger design feedback is almost irrelevant. From this it follows that subjects use feedback 
mainly as a tool for backing collusion, not as one for learning how to interact. If interaction is 
simultaneous, feedback has the standard effects. In sequential interaction, however, collusion is 
high with reduced and with full feedback, and it is low with partial feedback.  
If there is no fixed cost, feedback has the usual effects. With fixed cost, however, collusion is 
much higher with reduced and with full feedback. Although results are only weakly significant, 
it is also interesting to look at the interaction with surplus. If gains from collusion are high since 
most of the surplus is with consumers, feedback has the standard effects. With a symmetric dis-
tribution of the surplus between sellers and buyers, going from partial to full feedback no longer 
increases collusion. If most of the surplus is with producers anyhow, collusion even drops if one 
goes from partial to full feedback. Finally, if products are homogeneous, feedback has the usual 
effects. With substitutes, however, collusion goes down if one goes from partial to full feedback. 
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computer/human 
buyer  computer computer  (SD) computer  NOS 
computer/human 
buyer Sig. 
reduced 11,3589744  36,5257567 39  0,04509921
partial 42,462963  34,0491918 216   
full 57,3963964  45,5725753 111   
  human human  (SD) human  NOS  
reduced 1,8  22,9035883 40   
partial 12,2380952  32,6300845 42   










reduced 6,43243243  31,0527969 74  0,00488638
partial 39,1213389  35,7197002 239   
full 53,9354839  43,9032549 93   
  communication  communication (SD)  communication NOS 
reduced 7,8  25,2922913 5   
partial 17,6842105  27,166263 19   
full 75,2777778  51,0222622 18   
agreement  no agreement  no agreement (SD)  no agreement NOS  agreement Sig. 
reduced 6,44871795  30,7755374 78  0
partial 38,942623  35,5777244 244   
full 52,9278351  43,524717 97   
  agreement  agreement (SD)  agreement NOS 
reduced  12 .  1  
partial 13,1428571  25,7797092 14   
full 88,3571429  49,0174335 14   
partner/stranger  partner  partner (SD)  partner NOS 
partner/stranger 
Sig. 
reduced 4,85526316  29,7696507 76  0,004767
partial 35,6637555  36,3951937 229   
full 60,7710843  49,7477357 83   
  stranger stranger  (SD) stranger  NOS 
reduced 48,6666667  21,825062 3   
partial 52,3793103  23,7793635 29   
full 47,3928571  28,3957995 28   
sequence  simultaneous  simultaneous (SD)  simultaneous NOS  sequence Sig. 
reduced 5,20779221  29,8418364 77  0
partial 39,965368  35,74619 231   
full 51,4390244  28,1609561 82   
  sequential   sequential (SD)  sequential NOS 
reduced 57  7,07106781 2   
partial 16,8148148  26,4488433 27   
full 74,2413793  73,9399637 29   
fixed cost  no fixed cost  no fixed cost (SD)  no fixed cost NOS  fixed cost Sig. 
reduced 6,11538462  30,5694784 78  0,01127443
partial 36,5829384  36,3891205 211   
full 50,3555556  28,1880966 90   
  fixed cost  fixed cost (SD)  fixed cost NOS 
reduced  38 .  1  
partial 41,8510638  31,586306 47   
full 87,5714286  81,9008983 21   
surplus  producer producer  (SD) producer  NOS surplus  Sig. 
reduced 6,75  29,0789156 4  0,06648389
partial 15,7  53,1560595 10     42
full -2  15,5563492 2   
  symmetric  symmetric (SD)  symmetric NOS 
reduced 2,64102564  26,6916971 39   
partial 31,8701299  31,8864559 77   
full 29,125  23,5962568 16   
 consumer  consumer  (SD)  consumer  NOS 
reduced 10,6944444  34,6969076 36   
partial 41,374269  35,3614984 171   
full 64,4444444  46,6943471 90   
capacity  unconstrained unconstrained  (SD) unconstrained NOS  capacity Sig. 
reduced 24,0909091  49,451905 11  0,04256421
partial 53,6241611  29,4896859 149   
full 60,9659091  48,3346688 88   
  constrained constrained  (SD) constrained  NOS 
reduced 3,67647059  25,7887174 68   
partial 15,559633  31,1984185 109   
full 43,7391304  29,9927527 23   
homogeneity  homogeneous  homogeneous (SD)  homogeneous NOS  homogeneity Sig. 
reduced 2,67123288  27,9285073 73   
partial 30,793578  32,8133747 218  0
full 53,3291139  52,0031364 79   
  heterogeneous  heterogeneous (SD)  heterogeneous NOS 
reduced 53,3333333  22,6686274 6   
partial 74,325  26,4772641 40   
full 67,4375  20,4654508 32   
 
Table 69 
Feedback: Interaction Effects 
(normalized deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium) 
 
3.  Neutral vs. Market Frame 
In oligopoly experiments, it is standard to tell subjects that they are sellers in a market. Some 
experimenters wondered whether the explicit frame has an impact on the degree of collusion. 
This is indeed the case, but in a surprising direction. If subjects are given the underlying game in 
a neutral frame, cooperation (collusion) rates go up substantially. 
 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Mann-
Whitney 
market frame  35,8543046  40,9771246 453 0,0182041  0,004
neutral frame  57,2380952  24,9116534 21    
ordinary coverage  OC CW  OC CW (SD)  OC CW NOS OC CW ANOVA   
market frame  18,814346  30,5160302 237 0  0
neutral frame  50,0714286  22,1062619 14    
 
Table 70 
Frame: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(no treatment data available) 
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gross  CN  CN (SD)  CN NOS  CN ANOVA 
CN Mann-
Whitney 
market frame  -4,07651715 78,9314347 379 0,05460168  0,004 
neutral frame  29,3809524 39,0556989 21    
 
Table 71 
Frame: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from the ordinary coverage sample insignificant, no treatment data available 




IX. Sensitivity  of  Collusion to Buyer Activity 
1.  Computer vs. Human Buyers 
Oligopoly experiments are designed to learn more about the behaviour of sellers. This explains 
that buyers are usually replaced by a computer. This computer is programmed as a non-strategic 
actor. It simply represents the demand curve. This apparently innocent way of saving experimen-
tal resources, and of gaining full control over the opposite market side, has a dramatic influence 
on collusion. When subjects know that they are playing against human buyers, collusion rates 
plummet. 
 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW  Mann-
Whitney 
computer buyer  42,9770992  40,0226592 393 0  0
human buyer  6,60465116  28,256089 86    
ordinary coverage  OC CW  OC CW (SD)  OC CW NOS OC CW ANOVA   
computer buyer  27,1491713  29,8063167 181 0  0
human buyer  3,46666667  26,957591 75    
 
Table 72 
Human vs. Computer Buyers: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
(no treatment data available, data on CN and NN index insignificant) 
 
2.  Sensitivity of Collusion to the Trading Institution 
Trading institutions matter. This is one of the most robust findings from the experimental litera-
ture on oligopoly (see only Ketcham, Smith et al. 1984). In essence, this is a statement about the 
kind and the degree of buyer influence. The majority of oligopoly experiments uses the posted 
offer institution. Each seller is free to post a price. Buyers shop around, or efficient rationing 
does the shopping for them. This rule makes buyers almost passive. Consequently, collusion is   44
highest. The effect becomes even stronger in the “posted Diamond“ treatment.
13 This treatment 
is meant to test the model by (Diamond 1971). This is implemented by making shopping costly 
for buyers. All other trading institutions yield collusion rates far below this level. If participants 
at both sides of the market have an opportunity to submit a sealed bid, there is still a small 
amount of collusion. If they negotiate individually, collusion is already close to zero. In a double 
auction, average collusion falls below the Walrasian prediction. Under this rule, every higher bid 
by a buyer replaces all previous lower bids. Likewise every lower bid by a seller replaces all 
previous higher ones. 
gross  CW  CW (SD)  CW NOS  CW ANOVA 
CW Kruskal-
Wallis 
other trading institution  9,1875 29,200956 16 0  0
posted 48,6666667 38,414253 339    
posted Diamond  45,1875 24,6339028 16    
sealed bid  4,52941176 29,1099589 17    
negotiation 1,28571429 11,5653898 14   
double auction  -0,06493506 26,19579 77    




other trading institution  2,625 39,9032312 8 0  0
posted 35,4485294 24,447622 136    
posted Diamond  39 31,0207304 8    
sealed bid  4,52941176 29,1099589 17    
negotiation 1,28571429 11,5653898 14   
double auction  -1,02739726 26,5015579 73    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA   
other trading institution  13,1666667 12,576433 6 0,00116815  0,015
posted 18,2380952 19,0050119 21    
posted Diamond  56,75 22,3960562 4    
sealed bid  4,52941176 29,1099589 17    
negotiation 1,33333333 18,3393929 3   
double auction  3,66666667 18,8439709 15    
 
Table 73 
Trading Institution: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 
 
gross  CN  CN (SD)  CN NOS  CN ANOVA 
CN Kruskal-
Wallis 
other trading institution  -139,2 307,809754 10 0  0,008
posted 2,66043614 63,6344538 321    
posted Diamond  3,92857143 44,8492591 14    
negotiation -4,07692308 10,4360077 13    
double auction  -7,93478261 28,7992301 46    




other trading institution  -249 366,561318 6 0  0,003
posted 4,55462185 33,8645601 119    
posted Diamond  8,5 5,71839138 6    
negotiation -4,07692308 10,4360077 13    
                                        
13   Except for the CW index in the gross sample, where it is slightly below the value for ordinary posted offer 
experiments, and far above all the results for all other trading institutions.   45
double auction  -9,8372093 28,7409864 43    
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA   
posted 2,61538462 33,0493027 13 0,01841942  0,022
posted Diamond  55,5 22,6936114 4    
negotiation -9 5,65685425 2    
double auction  -26,1428571 51,6540691 7    
 
Table 74 
Trading Institution: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
 




institution -85,3333333  73,9963963 6 0  0
posted 38,9903846  173,147159 312    
posted Dia-
mond 271,25  613,814576 16  
 
negotiation -1,61538462  7,03015483 13    
double auction  4,725  43,3814255 40    
ordinary cov-
erage  OC NN  OC NN (SD)  OC NN NOS  OC NN ANOVA 
 
other trading 
institution -85,3333333  73,9963963 6 0 0,011
posted 76,6869565  273,718429 115    
posted Dia-
mond  488 836,420776 8  
 
negotiation -1,61538462  7,03015483 13    
double auction  4,72972973  45,1470736 37    
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA   
posted 56,9230769  154,47139 13 0,91419845  0,094
posted Dia-
mond  63 26,0895892 4  
 
negotiation -1,5  0,70710678 2    
double auction  33,4285714  104,485816 7    
 
Table 75 
Trading Institution: Proprotional Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
 
3.  Collusion under Conditions of Demand Inertia 
In reality, demand is hardly ever perfectly elastic. Buyers hold to their buying habits as long as a 
competing offer is not clearly more attractive in qualitative terms, or substantially cheaper. Ex-
perimenters have tested markets with such demand inertia. The result is as one would expect. 
Market outcomes are further away from both the Walrasian and the Nash predictions. 
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ordinary coverage  OC CW  OC CW (SD)  OC CW NOS  OC CW ANOVA 
CW Mann Whit-
ney 
no demand inertia  17,0877193  30,4451732 228 0  0
demand inertia  45,6428571  21,6798495 28    
treatment  T CW  T CW (SD)  T CW NOS  T CW ANOVA   
no demand inertia  34  11,8039541 4 0,28745551  0,141
demand inertia  45,2666667  20,2006032 30    
 
Table 76 
Demand Inertia: Normalized Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium 




ordinary coverage  OC CN  OC CN (SD)  OC CN NOS OC CN ANOVA 
CN Mann Whit-
ney 
no demand inertia  -11,2981366  86,0650077 161 0,09737016  0,001
demand inertia  17  19,3845299 26    
treatment  T CN  T CN (SD)  T CN NOS  T CN ANOVA   
no demand inertia  -16,25  46,5429909 4 0,06294287  0,347
demand inertia  10,75  22,7899019 28    
 
Table 77 
Demand Inertia: Normalized Deviation from the Nash Equilibrium 
(data from gross sample insignificant) 
 
 
gross  NN  NN (SD)  NN NOS  NN ANOVA 
NN Mann-
Whitney 
no demand inertia  31,2165242  164,653693 351 0,00144229  0
demand inertia  144,555556  420,534112 36    
ordinary coverage  OC NN  OC NN (SD)  OC NN NOS  OC NN ANOVA   
no demand inertia  49,8476821  243,190865 151 0,04129457  0
demand inertia  172,785714  474,662637 28    
treatment  T NN  T NN (SD)  T NN NOS  T NN ANOVA   
no demand inertia  44  0 2 0,7102944  0,777
demand inertia  172,035714  474,71032 28    
 
Table 78 




Experimental research on oligopoly is rich, but it is not complete. There is one main effect that 
has not been tested: increasing returns to scale, or a supply curve with a negative slope. Also, 
nobody has ever given up the implicit assumption that barriers to entry are prohibitively high. 
Since both is frequent in practice, it would be worthwhile testing.  
There are many more white marks on the map when it comes to the interaction between several 
parameters characterising an oligopoly market. This study makes them visible in two different   47
dimensions. The first one is straightforward. To the best of our knowledge, quite a number of 
combinations of features have simply not been studied. Among the lacunae are the following: 
there is no experiment testing substitutes in a double auction or with human buyers. Nobody has 
explored the effect of a positive fixed cost in a double auction or in a stranger design. There is 
much less research on constant demand, compared to demand decreasing in quantity. Among the 
missing combinations is again the double auction, asymmetry, reduced feedback or a chance to 
conclude an agreement. Supply decreasing in quantity has not been studied in a stranger design. 
There is relatively little work on markets where the majority of the surplus is with producers. 
This has not been studied in a market of two, with a stranger design, with substitutes or with se-
quential interaction.  
Nobody has given strangers a chance to communicate or to conclude an agreement. The oppor-
tunity to agree has also not been tested in markets of a larger size than four, if there is advance 
production, or if the majority of the surplus is with producers. There is no study testing full ex 
ante information in a double auction. Partial ex ante information has not been combined with 
sequential interaction or with negotiation. Human buyers have not been introduced in experi-
ments using a stranger design, giving subjects full feedback, leaving capacity unconstrained, or 
differentiating products. In many contexts the double auction has not been used. There is no 
study imposing it in duopoly or triopoly markets. Subjects have never received full ex ante in-
formation. There has been no demand inertia. Products have always been homogeneous. No 
seller has had power. Experimenters have always used a fixed partner design. Capacity has al-
ways been constrained. 
It has been one of the purpose of this study to make data on interaction effects available, al-
though no experimenter has explicitly tested for them. This, however, only works if, in this meta 
study, the effects are significant. For reasons of space, not all of them could be reported. But 
many of the potential interaction effects are simply not significant. From a policy perspective, it 
for instance would be desirable to know more about the effect of experience on the likelihood 
that firms will beat the Nash equilibrium. Although a crosstable shows that there is data on many 
combinations, only one of the effects is significant. If one of the subjects has power, experience 
pushes collusion high above the Nash equilibrium.  
 
  no power  no power (SD)  no power NOS  power Sig. 
no experience  3,19626168 51,1824138 321 0,012 
experience 12,8703704 38,3317427 54  
  power  power (SD)  power NOS   
no experience  -100,555556 215,453785 27  
experience 46,5 3,53553391 2  
 
Table 79 
Experience – Power: Interaction Effect 
(normalized deviation from the Nash equilibrium) 
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A closer look at the data demonstrates why further research on interaction effects is a desidera-
tum. In the critical cell, the effect is based on just two observations. It has only become signifi-
cant since the impact of experience is dramatic. This implies that explicit tests of interaction ef-
fects should be able to establish many more of them. This study, and the data bank behind it, 
may help experimenters build expectations about the direction of the interaction effects, and 
where they are particularly likely to be found. 
   49
References 
 
ALGER, DAN (1987). “Laboratory Tests of Equilibrium Predictions with Disequilibrium Data.“ 
Review of Economic Studies 54: 105-145. 
ALLEN, BETH and MARTIN HELLWIG (1986a). Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets.“ 
Review of Economic Studies 53: 175-204. 
ALLEN, BETH and MARTIN HELLWIG (1986b). “Price-Setting Firms and the Oligopolistic Foun-
dations of Perfect Competition.“ American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 
76: 387-392. 
ALTAVILLA,  CARLO, LUIGI LUINI and PATRIZIA  SBRIGLIA (2005). Social Learning in Market 
Games http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/labsi/labsi_paper/labsi3.pdf. 
ANDERHUB, VITAL, WERNER GÜTH, ULRICH KAMECKE and HANS-THEO NORMANN (2003). “Ca-
pacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets.“ Experimental Economics 
6: 27-52. 
AUMANN, ROBERT J. and LLOYD S. SHAPLEY (1994). Long Term Competition - A Game Theo-
retic Analysis. Collected Papers I. Robert J. Aumann. Cambridge, MIT Press: 395-409. 
BENSON, BRUCE L. and M.D. FAMINOW (1988). “The Impact of Experience on Prices and Profits 
in Experimental Duopoly Markets.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 9: 345-
365. 
BERTRAND, JOSEPH LOUIS FRANCOIS (1883). “Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale par 
León Walras. Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses par 
Augustin Cournot.“ Journal des savants 67: 499-508. 
BORTZ, JÜRGEN (2005). Statistik für Human- und Sozialwissenschaftler. Heidelberg, Springer. 
BOSCH-DOMÈNECH, ANTONI and NICOLAAS J. VRIEND (2003). “Imitation of Successful Behavior 
in Cournot Markets.“ Economic Journal 113: 495-524. 
CAPRA, MONICA C., JACOB K. GOEREE, ROSARIO GOMEZ and CHARLES A. HOLT (2002). “Learn-
ing and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competi-
tion.“ International Economic Review 43: 613-636. 
CASON, TIMOTHY N. and DOUGLAS D. DAVIS (1995). “Price Communication in a Multi-Market 
Context. An Experimental Investigation.“ Review of Industrial Organization 10: 769-787. 
CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD (1933). The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. Cambridge,, Harvard 
University Press.   50
COURNOT, ANTOINE-AUGUSTIN (1838). Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie 
des richesses. Paris,, Libraririe des sciences politiques et sociales M. Riveáre & cie. 
COX, JAMES C. and MARK WALKER (1998). “Learning to Play Cournot Duopoly Strategies.“ 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 36: 141-161. 
CRAWFORD, VINCENT (1998). “A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk.“ 
Journal of Economic Theory 78(2): 286-298. 
DAUGHETY, ANDREW F. and ROBERT FORSYTHE (1987). “The Effects of Industry-Wide Price 
Regulation on Industrial Organization.“ Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3: 
397-434. 
DAVIDSON, CARL and RAYMOND J. DENECKERE (1986). “Long-Run Competition in Capacity, 
Short-Run Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model.“ Rand Journal of Economics 17: 
404-415. 
DAVIS, DOUGLAS D. and CHARLES A. HOLT (1993). Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton Univ. Press. 
DAVIS, DOUGLAS D., ROBERT J. REILLY and BART WILSON (2003). “Cost Structures and Nash 
Play in Repeated Cournot Games.“ Experimental Economics 6: 209-226. 
DAVIS, DOUGLAS and BART WILSON (2005). “Differentiated Product Competition and the Anti-
trust Logit Model. An Experimental Analysis.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organi-
zation 57: 89-113. 
DIAMOND, PETER (1971). “A Model of Price Adjustments.“ Journal of Economic Theory 3: 156-
168. 
EDGEWORTH, FRANCIS (1897). “La Teoria Pura del Monopolio.“ Giornale degli Economisti 40: 
13-31. 
FOURAKER,  LAWRENCE  E. and SIDNEY  SIEGEL (1963). Bargaining Behavior. New York,, 
McGraw-Hill. 
FRIEDMAN, DANIEL (1969). “On Experimental Research in Oligopoly.“ Review of Economic 
Studies 36: 399-415. 
FRIEDMAN, MILTON (1953). Essays in Positive Economics. [Chicago], University of Chicago 
Press. 
FUDENBERG, DREW and JEAN TIROLE (1991). Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
HAYS, WILLIAM LEE (1994). Statistics. Fort Worth, Harcourt College Publishers.   51
HOGGATT, AUSTIN CURWOOD (1959). “An Experimental Business Game.“ Behavioral Science 4: 
192-203. 
HOLT, CHARLES A. (1995). Industrial Organization. A Survey of Laboratory Research. Hand-
book of Experimental Economics. John H. Kagel und Alvin E. Roth. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press: 349-443. 
HOLT, CHARLES A. and FERNANDO SOLIS-SOBERON (1992). “The Calculation of Equilibrium 
Mixed Strategies in Posted-Offer Auctions.“ Research in Experimental Economics 5: 189-
228. 
HUCK, STEFFEN, HANS-THEO NORMANN and JÖRG OECHSSLER (2004). “Two are Few and Four 
are Many. Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 53: 435-446. 
ISAAC, R. MARK, VALÉRIE RAMEY and ARLINGTON W. WILLIAMS (1984). “The Effects of Market 
Organization on Conspiracy in Restraints of Trade.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Or-
ganization 5: 191-222. 
KETCHAM, JON, VERNON L. SMITH and ARLINGTON W. WILLIAMS (1984). “A Comparison of 
Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions.“ Review of Economic Studies 51: 
595-614. 
KREPS, DAVID M. and JOSE ALEXANDRE SCHEINKMAN (1983). “Quantity Precommitment and 
Bertrand Competition Yields Cournot Outcomes.“ Bell Journal of Economics 14: 326-337. 
LUPI, PAOLO and PATRIZIA SBRIGLIA (2003). “Exploring Human Behaviour and Learning in Ex-
perimental Cournot Settings.“ Rivista Internazionale di Studi Sociali 51: 373-397. 
NAGEL, ROSEMARIE and NICOLAAS J. VRIEND (1999a). “An Experimental Study of Adaptive Be-
haviour in an Oligopolistic Market Game.“ Journal of Evolutionary Economics 9: 27-65. 
NAGEL, ROSEMARIE and NICOLAAS J. VRIEND (1999b). “Inexperienced and Experienced Players 
in an Oligopolistic Market Game with Minimal Information.“ Industrial and Corporate 
Change 8: 41-65. 
OFFERMAN, THEO, JAN POTTERS and JOEP SONNEMANS (2002). “Imitation and Belief Learning in 
an Oligopoly Experiment.“ Review of Economic Studies 69: 973-997. 
PLOTT,  CHARLES  R. (1982). “Industrial Organization. Theory and Experimental Economics.“ 
Journal of Economic Literature 20: 1485-1527. 
PLOTT, CHARLES R. (1989). An Updated Review of Industrial Organization. Applications of Ex-
perimental Methods. Handbook of Industrial Organization. Richard Schmalensee und 
Robert D. Willig. Amsterdam, North Holland: 1109-1176.   52
RASSENTI, STEPHEN, STANLEY S. REYNOLDS, VERNON L.  SMITH and FERENC SZIDAROVSZKY 
(2000). “Adaptation Convergence of Behaviour in Repeated Experimental Cournot 
Games.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 41: 117-146. 
SELTEN, REINHARD (1973). “A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, Where Four Are Few 
and Six Are Many.“ International Journal of Game Theory 2: 141-201. 
SELTEN, REINHARD (1978). “The Chain Store Paradox.“ Theory and Decision 9: 127-159. 
SELTEN, REINHARD and HEINZ SAUERMANN (1959). “Ein Oligopolexperiment.“ Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 115: 427-471. 
SELTEN, REINHARD and ROLF STOECKER (1986). “End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner's 
Dilemma Supergames.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 7: 47-70. 
SHERMAN, ROGER (1969). “Risk Attitude and Cost Variability in a Capacity Choice Experi-
ment.“ Review of Economic Studies 36: 453-466. 
SHUBIK, MARTIN, GERRIT WOLF and SCOTT LOCKHART (1971). “An Artificial Player for a Busi-
ness Market Game.“ Simulation and Games 2: 27-43. 
SMITH, VERNON L. (1976). “Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory.“ American Eco-
nomic Review Papers and Proceedings 66: 274-279. 
STACKELBERG,  HEINRICH VON (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Wien und Berlin,, J. 
Springer. 
SUETENS, SIGRID (2004). R&D Cooperation in Oligopoly with Spillovers. An Experimental Eco-
nomics Approach. Literature Review 
 http://www.ua.ac.be/download.aspx?c=*TEWHI&n=14378&ct=009844&e=34935. 
SUETENS, SIGRID and JAN POTTERS (2005). Bertrand Colludes More Than Cournot 
 http://ideas.repec.org/p/ant/wpaper/2005037.html. 
TIROLE, JEAN (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
   53
papers included in the meta-study 
 
ABBINK, KLAUS and JORDI BRANDTS (2003). 24  
 http://www.iae-csic.uab.es/brandts/pub/24-revised.pdf. 
ABBINK, KLAUS and JORDI BRANDTS (2005a). Collusion in Growing and Shrinking Markets. 
Empirical Evidence from Experimental Duopolies 
 http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/papers/2005-03.pdf. 
ABBINK, KLAUS and JORDI BRANDTS (2005b). “Price Competition under Cost Uncertainty. A 
Laboratory Analysis.“ Economic Inquiry 43: 636-648. 
ABRAMS, ERIC, MARTIN SEFTON and ABDULLAH YAVAS (2000). “An Experimental Comparison 
of two Search Models.“ Economic Theory 16: 735-749. 
ALTAVILLA,  CARLO, LUIGI LUINI and PATRIZIA  SBRIGLIA (2005). Social Learning in Market 
Games http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/labsi/labsi_paper/labsi3.pdf. 
ANDERHUB, VITAL, WERNER GÜTH, ULRICH KAMECKE and HANS-THEO NORMANN (2003). “Ca-
pacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets.“ Experimental Economics 
6: 27-52. 
BAILEY, JEFF and STUART MESTELMAN (2002). Testing and Verifying Cournot and Bertrand 
Theories of Duopoly Markets 
BOSCH-DOMÈNECH, ANTONI and NICOLAAS J. VRIEND (2003). “Imitation of Successful Behavior 
in Cournot Markets.“ Economic Journal 113: 495-524. 
BRANDTS, JORDI and PABLO GUILLÉN (2004). Collusion into Fights in an Experiment with Price-
Setting Firms and Production in Advance http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2004/61804.pdf. 
BROWN  KRUSE,  JAMIE, STEPHEN  RASSENTI, STANLEY  S.  REYNOLDS and VERNON  L.  SMITH 
(1994). “Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition in Experimental Markets.“ Econometrica 62: 
343-371. 
CAPRA, MONICA C., JACOB K. GOEREE, ROSARIO GOMEZ and CHARLES A. HOLT (2002). “Learn-
ing and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competi-
tion.“ International Economic Review 43: 613-636. 
CARLSON, JOHN A. (1967). “The Stability of an Experimental Market with a Supply-Response 
Lag.“ Southern Economic Journal 33: 305-321. 
CASON, TIMOTHY N. and DOUGLAS D. DAVIS (1995). “Price Communication in a Multi-Market 
Context. An Experimental Investigation.“ Review of Industrial Organization 10: 769-787.   54
CASON, TIMOTHY N. and DANIEL FRIEDMAN (2003). “Buyer Search and Price Dispersion. A 
Laboratory Study.“ Journal of Economic Theory 112: 232-260. 
COOK, WILLIAM D. and E.C.H. VEENDORP (1975). “Six Markets in Search of an Auctioneer.“ 
Canadian Journal of Economics 8: 238-257. 
CRÖSSMANN,  HEINZ  JÜRGEN (1982). Entscheidungsverhalten auf unvollkommenen Märkten. 
Frankfurt, Barudio. 
DAUGHETY, ANDREW F. and ROBERT FORSYTHE (1987). Industrywide Regulation and the Forma-
tion of Reputations. A Laboratory Analysis. Public Regulation. New Perspectives on Insti-
tutions and Policies. Elizabeth E. Bailey. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press: 347-398. 
DAVIS, DOUGLAS (1996). “Consumer Search Costs and Market Performance.“ Economic Inquiry 
34: 133-151. 
DAVIS, DOUGLAS (1998). “Conspiracies and Secret Discounts in Laboratory Markets.“ Economic 
Journal 108: 736-756. 
DAVIS, DOUGLAS D. (1999). “Advanced Production and Cournot Outcomes. An Experimental 
Investigation.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 40: 59-79. 
DAVIS, DOUGLAS D. and ARLINGTON W. WILLIAMS (1986). “The Effects of Rent Asymmetries in 
Posted Offer Markets.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 7: 303-316. 
DAVIS, DOUGLAS D. and BART WILSON (2003). Horizontal Merger, Strategic Buyers and Fixed 
Cost Synergies. An Experimental Investigation 
 http://www.people.vcu.edu/~dddavis/working%20papers/dw0803.pdf. 
DAVIS, DOUGLAS and CHARLES A. HOLT (1994). “Market Power and Mergers in Laboratory 
Markets with Posted Prices.“ Rand Journal of Economics 25: 467-487. 
DAVIS, DOUGLAS and BART WILSON (2000). “Firm-Specific Cost Savings and Market Power.“ 
Economic Theory 16: 545-565. 
DIXON, HUW D., PATRIZIA SBRIGLIA and ERNESTO SOMMA (2003). Learning to Collude. An Ex-
periment in Convergence and Equilibrium Selection in Oligopoly 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=877231. 
DOLBAER, F.G., L.B. LAVE, G. BOWMAN, A. LIEBERMAN, E. PRESCOTT, F. RUETTER and R. 
SHERMAN (1968). “Collusion in Oligopoly. An Experiment on the Effect of Numbers and 
Information.“ Quarterly Journal of Economics 82: 240-259. 
DUFWENBERG, MARTIN and URI GNEEZY (2000). “Price Competition and Market Concentration. 
An Experimental Study.“ International Journal of Industrial Organization 18: 7-22.   55
DUFWENBERG, MARTIN, URI GNEEZY, JACOB K. GOEREE and ROSEMARIE NAGEL (2002). Price 
Floors and Competition http://www.ne.su.se/paper/wp02_13.pdf. 
DUGAR, SUBHASISH (2005). Do Price-Matching Guarantees Facilitate Tacit Collusion? An Ex-
perimental Study http://ssrn.com/abstract=655392. 
DUGAR, SUBHASISH and TODD SORENSEN (2005). Hassle Costs, Price-Matching Guarantees and 
Price Competition. An Experiment http://ssrn.com/abstract=727324. 
FAJFAR, PABLO (2005). Information and Competition in Cournot's Model. Evidence from the 
Laboratory http://ssrn.com/abstract=884231. 
FEINBERG, ROBERT M. and THOMAS A. HUSTED (1993). “An Experimental Test of Discount-Rate 
Effects on Collusive Behaviour in Duopoly Markets.“ Journal of Industrial Economics 41: 
153-160. 
FEINBERG, ROBERT M. and ROGER SHERMAN (1988). “Mutual Forbearance under Experimental 
Conditions.“ Southern Economic Journal 54: 985-993. 
FONSECA, MIGUEL A., STEFFEN HUCK and HANS-THEO NORMANN (2005). “Playing Cournot Al-
though They Shouldn't.“ Economic Theory 25: 669-677. 
FONSECA, MIGUEL A., WIELAND MÜLLER and HANS-THEO NORMANN (2005). Endogenous Tim-
ing in Duopoly. Experimental Evidence 
 http://greywww.kub.nl:2080/greyfiles/center/2005/doc/77.pdf. 
FOURAKER,  LAWRENCE  E. and SIDNEY  SIEGEL (1963). Bargaining Behavior. New York, 
McGraw-Hill. 
FRIEDMAN, JAMES W. and AUSTIN CURWOOD HOGGATT (1980). An Experiment in Noncoopera-
tive Oligopoly. Greenwich, Conn., JAI Press. 
GARCÍA GALLEGO, AURORA (1998). “Oligopoly Experimentation of Learning with Simulated 
Markets.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 35: 333-355. 
GARCÍA GALLEGO, AURORA and NIKOLAOS GEORGANTZIS (2001). “Multiproduct Activity in an 
Experimental Differentiated Oligopoly.“ International Journal of Industrial Organization 
19: 493-518. 
GOODWIN, DAVID and STUART MESTELMAN (2003). Advance Production Duopolies and Posted 
Prices or Market-Clearing Prices 
 http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/mceel/papers/KSDuopAllAug03.pdf. 
GRETHER, DAVID M. and CHARLES R. PLOTT (1984). “The Effects of Market Practices in Oli-
gopolistic Markets. An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case.“ Economic Inquiry 
22: 479-507.   56
GÜTH, WERNER, WIELAND MÜLLER and YOSSI SPIEGEL (2006). “Noisy Leadership. An Experi-
mental Approach.“ Games and Economic Behavior forthcoming. 
HARSTAD, RONALD, STEPHEN MARTIN and HANS-THEO NORMANN (1998). Intertemporal Pricing 
Schemes. Experimental Tests of Consciously Parallel Behaviour in Oligopoly. Applied In-
dustrial Economics. Louis Phlips. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 123-151. 
HOFFMAN, ELIZABETH and CHARLES R. PLOTT (1981). “The Effect of Intertemporal Speculation 
on the Outcomes in Seller Posted Offer Auction Markets.“ Quarterly Journal of Economics 
96: 223-242. 
HOGGATT, AUSTIN CURWOOD (1959). “An Experimental Business Game.“ Behavioral Science 4: 
192-203. 
HOGGATT, AUSTIN CURWOOD (1969). “Response of Paid Student Subjects to Differential Behav-
iour of Robots in Bifurcated Duopoly Games.“ Review of Economic Studies 36: 417-432. 
HOLT, CHARLES A. (1985). “An Experimental Test of the Consistent-Conjectures Hypothesis.“ 
American Economic Review 75: 314-325. 
HOLT, CHARLES A. and ANNE P. VILLAMIL (1986). “A Laboratory Experiment with a Singe-
Person Cobweb.“ Atlantic Economic Journal 14/2: 51-54. 
HONG, JAMES T. and CHARLES R. PLOTT (1982). “Rate Filing Policies for Inland Water Transpor-
tation. An Experimental Approach.“ Bell Journal of Economics 13: 1-19. 
HUCK,  STEFFEN, WIELAND  MÜLLER and HANS-THEO  NORMANN (2001). “Stackelberg Beats 
Cournot. On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets.“ Economic Journal 111: 
749-765. 
HUCK, STEFFEN, WIELAND MÜLLER and HANS-THEO NORMANN (2002). “To Commit or Not to 
Commit. Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets.“ Games and Economic 
Behavior 38: 240-264. 
HUCK, STEFFEN, WIELAND MÜLLER and HANS-THEO NORMANN (2004). “Strategic Delegation in 
Experimental Markets.“ International Journal of Industrial Organization 22: 561-574. 
HUCK, STEFFEN, HANS-THEO NORMANN and JÖRG OECHSSLER (1999). “Learning in Cournot Oli-
gopoly. An Experiment.“ Economic Journal 109: C80-C95. 
HUCK, STEFFEN, HANS-THEO NORMANN and JÖRG OECHSSLER (2000). “Does Information About 
Competitor's Actions Increase or Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly Mar-
kets?“ International Journal of Industrial Organization 18: 39-57. 
HUCK, STEFFEN, HANS-THEO NORMANN and JÖRG OECHSSLER (2001). “Market Volatility and 
Inequality in Earnings. Experimental Evidence.“ Economics Letters 70: 363-368.   57
HUCK, STEFFEN, HANS-THEO NORMANN and JÖRG OECHSSLER (2002). “Stability of the Cournot 
Process. Experimental Evidence.“ International Journal of Game Theory 31: 123-136. 
HUCK, STEFFEN, HANS-THEO NORMANN and JÖRG OECHSSLER (2004). “Two are Few and Four 
are Many. Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 53: 435-446. 
HUCK, STEFFEN and BRIAN WALLACE (2002). “Reciprocal Strategies and Aspiration Levels in a 
Cournot-Stackelberg Experiment.“ Economics Bulletin 3/3: 1-7. 
ISAAC, R. MARK and CHARLES R. PLOTT (1981a). “The Opportunity for Conspiracy in Restraint 
of Trade. An Experimental Study.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2: 1-30. 
ISAAC, R. MARK and CHARLES R. PLOTT (1981b). “Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction 
Markets. An Experimental Examination.“ American Economic Review 71: 448-459. 
ISAAC, R. MARK, VALÉRIE RAMEY and ARLINGTON W. WILLIAMS (1984). “The Effects of Market 
Organization on Conspiracy in Restraints of Trade.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Or-
ganization 5: 191-222. 
JOHNSON, MICHAEL D. and CHARLES R. PLOTT (1989). “The Effect of Two Trading Institutions 
on Price Expectations and the Stability of Supply-Response Lag Markets.“ Journal of Eco-
nomic Psychology 10: 189-216. 
JULLIEN, CÉLINE and BERNARD RUFFIEUX (2001). “Innovation, avantages concurrentiels et con-
currence. Une Analyse expérimentelle des incitations à innover et de l'efficacité des 
marchés en présence de chocs endogènes.“ Revue d'Économie Politique 111: 121-149. 
KESER, CLAUDIA (1993). “Some Results of Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Iner-
tia.“ Journal of Industrial Economics 41: 133-151. 
KESER, CLAUDIA (2000). “Cooperation in Symmetric Duopolies with Demand Inertia.“ Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization 18: 23-38. 
KÜBLER, DOROTHEA and WIELAND MÜLLER (2002). “Simultaneous and Sequential Price Com-
petition in Heterogeneous Duopoly Markets. Experimental Evidence.“ International Jour-
nal of Industrial Organization 20: 1437-1460. 
MARTINI, GIANMARIA (2003). “Complexity and Individual Rationality in a Dynamic Duopoly. 
An Experimental Study.“ Research in Economics 57: 345-370. 
MASON, CHARLES F. and OWEN R. PHILLIPS (1997). “Information and Cost Asymmetry in Ex-
perimental Duopoly Markets.“ Review of Economics and Statistics 79: 290-299.   58
MASON, CHARLES F., OWEN R. PHILLIPS and CLIFFORD NOWELL (1992). “Duopoly Behavior in 
Asymmetric Markets. An Experimental Evaluation.“ Review of Economics and Statistics 
74: 662-670. 
MESTELMAN, STUART, DEBORAH WELLAND and DOUGLAS WELLAND (1987). “Advance Produc-
tion in Posted Offer Markets.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 8: 249-264. 
MESTELMAN, STUART and DOUGLAS WELLAND (1987). “Advance Production in Oral Double 
Auction Markets.“ Economics Letters 23: 43-48. 
MESTELMAN, STUART and DOUGLAS WELLAND (1988). “Advance Production in Experimental 
Markets.“ Review of Economic Studies 55: 641-654. 
MESTELMAN, STUART and DOUGLAS WELLAND (1991). “The Effects of Rent Asymmetries in 
Markets Characterized by Advance Production. A Comparison of Trading Institutions.“ 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 15: 387-405. 
MILLER, ROSS M., CHARLES R. PLOTT and VERNON L. SMITH (1977). “Intertemporal Competitive 
Equilibrium. An Empirical Study of Speculation.“ Quarterly Journal of Economics 91: 
599-624. 
MORGAN, JOHN, HENRIK ORZEN and MARTIN SEFTON (2006). “An Experimental Study of Price 
Dispersion.“ Games and Economic Behavior 54: 134-158. 
MÜLLER, WIELAND (2006). “Allowing for Two Production Periods in the Cournot Duopoly. Ex-
perimental Evidence.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 60: 100-111. 
MUREN, ASTRI (2000). “Quantity Precommitment in an Experimental Oligopoly Market.“ Jour-
nal of Economic Behavior & Organization 41: 147-157. 
MUREN, ASTRI and ROGER PYDDOKE (1999). Does Collusion Without Communication Exist? 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/sunrpe/1999_0011.html. 
MURPHY, JAMES L. (1966). “Effects of the Threat of Losses on Duopoly Bargaining.“ Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 80: 296-313. 
OECHSSLER, JÖRG and FRANK SCHUHMACHER (2004). “The Limited Liability Effect in Experi-
mental Duopoly Markets.“ International Journal of Industrial Organization 22: 163-184. 
OFFERMAN, THEO, JAN POTTERS and JOEP SONNEMANS (2002). “Imitation and Belief Learning in 
an Oligopoly Experiment.“ Review of Economic Studies 69: 973-997. 
ORZEN, HENRIK (2005). Concentration and Competition. An Experiment 
 http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/papers/2005-06.pdf.   59
PANTZ, KATINKA and ANTHONY ZIEGELMEYER (2004). Collaborative Networks in Experimental 
Triopolies ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2005-38.pdf. 
PHILLIPS, OWEN R. and CHARLES F. MASON (1992). “Mutual Forbearance in Experimental Con-
glomerate Markets.“ Rand Journal of Economics 23: 395-414. 
PLOTT, CHARLES R. and VERNON L. SMITH (1978). “An Experimental Examination of Two Ex-
change Institutions.“ Review of Economic Studies 45: 133-153. 
PLOTT, CHARLES R. and JONATHAN T. UHL (1981). “Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen. 
An Empirical Study.“ Southern Economic Journal 47: 1063-1071. 
RASSENTI, STEPHEN, STANLEY S. REYNOLDS, VERNON L.  SMITH and FERENC SZIDAROVSZKY 
(2000). “Adaptation Convergence of Behaviour in Repeated Experimental Cournot 
Games.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 41: 117-146. 
RUFFLE, BRADLEY J. (2000). “Some Factors Affecting Demand Withholding in Posted-Offer 
Markets.“ Economic Theory 16: 529-544. 
SAUERMANN, HEINZ and REINHARD SELTEN (1959). “Ein Oligopolexperiment.“ Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 115: 427-471. 
SELTEN, REINHARD (1967a). Ein Oligopolexperiment mit Preisvariation und Investition. Beiträge 
zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung. Ernst Sauermann. Tübingen, Mohr: 103-135. 
SELTEN, REINHARD (1967b). Investitionsverhalten im Oligopolexperiment. Beiträge zur Experi-
mentellen Wirtschaftsforschung I. Ernst Sauermann. Tübingen, Mohr: 60-102. 
SELTEN, REINHARD (1970). Ein Marktexperiment. Beiträger zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsfor-
schung II. Ernst Sauermann. Tübingen, Mohr: 33-98. 
SELTEN, REINHARD and CLAUS C. BERG (1970). Drei experimentelle Oligopolspielserien mit 
kontinuierlichem Zeitablauf. Beiträge zur Experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung II. Ernst 
Sauermann. Tübingen, Mohr: 162-221. 
SHERMAN, ROGER (1971). “An Experiment on the Persistence of Price Collusion.“ Southern Eco-
nomic Journal 37: 489-495. 
SHERMAN,  ROGER (1972). Oligopoly. An Empirical Approach. Lexington, Mass., Lexington 
Books. 
SHUBIK, MARTIN, GERRIT WOLF and HERBERT B. EISENBERG (1972). “Some Experiences with an 
Experimental Oligopoly Business Game.“ General Systems 17: 61-74. 
SMITH, VERNON L. and ARLINGTON W. WILLIAMS (1981). “On Nonbinding Price Controls in a 
Competitive Market.“ American Economic Review 71: 467-474.   60
SMITH, VERNON L. and ARLINGTON W. WILLIAMS (1982). “The Effects of Rent Asymmetries in 
Experimental Aucion Markets.“ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 3: 99-116. 
SMITH, VERNON L., ARLINGTON W. WILLIAMS, W. KENNETH BRATTON and MICHAEL G. VAN-
NONI (1982). “Competitive Market Institutions. Double Auction vs. Sealed Bid-Offer.“ 
American Economic Review 72: 58-77. 
STOECKER, ROLF (1980). Experimentelle Untersuchung des Entscheidungsverhaltens im Bert-
rand-Oligopol. Bielefeld, Pfeffer. 
SUETENS,  SIGRID (2003). Does R& Cooperation Facilitate Price Collusion? An Experiment 
http://greywww.kub.nl:2080/greyfiles/center/2003/doc/99.pdf. 
SUETENS, SIGRID (2005). “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Experimental Duopoly Mar-
kets.“ International Journal of Industrial Organization 23: 63-82. 
WELLFORD, CHARISSA PEPIN (1990). Takeovers and Horizontal Mergers. Policy and Perform-
ance. Ann Arbor, UMI. 
WILLIAMS, ARLINGTON W. (1979). “Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium. On Further Experi-
mental Results.“ Research in Experimental Economics 1: 255-278. 
WILLIAMS, ARLINGTON W. (1987). “The Formation of Price Forecasts in Experimental Markets.“ 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 19: 1-18. 
WILLIAMS, ARLINGTON W. and VERNON L. SMITH (1984). “Cyclical Double-Auction Markets 
with and without Speculators.“ Journal of Business 57: 1-33. 
WOLF, GERRIT and MARTIN SHUBIK (1975). “Teams Compared to Individuals in Duopoly Games 
with an Artifical Player.“ Southern Economic Journal 41: 635-648. 
 
 